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 The standpoint of environmental justice has become integral to 
environmental law in the last thirty years. Environmental justice criticizes 
mainstream environmental law and advocacy institutions on three main fronts: 
for paying too little attention to the distributive effects of environmental policy; 
for emphasizing elite and professional advocacy over participation in decision 
making by affected communities; and for adhering to a woods-and-waters view 
of which problems count as “environmental” that disregards the importance of 
neighborhoods, workplaces, and cities. This Article highlights the existence of 
a “long environmental justice movement” that, like the long movements for 
racial equality and labor organizing, put questions of economic power and 
distribution, democracy, and workplaces and neighborhoods at the center of 
environmental politics for many decades before the watershed era of 
environmental law making, 1970–77. The mystery is why this long 
environmental justice movement did not have more effect on the mainstream 
environmental law that arose in that period. The Article shows that we can 
better understand the omissions of environmental justice concerns by 
appreciating that mainstream environmental law was the last major legal 
product of “the great exception,” the decades of the mid-twentieth century 
when, unlike any other time in modern history, economic inequality was 
declining and robust growth was widely shared. The assumptions of that time, 
along with key contingent decisions by the Ford Foundation, labor unions, and 
other early funders produced an environmental law that, more than much of the 
preceding environmental politics, neglected questions of justice. To give both 
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environmental law and environmental justice their due, we must both locate 
environmental law within our new historical understanding of patterns of 
economic inequality and recognize that environmental justice is a recovery and 
extension of an essential and neglected strand of politics and law. 
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In the last thirty-five years, environmental justice has established itself as 
an integral part of environmental law and politics. It has emphasized a pair of 
themes. First, environmental justice movements and scholars have worked to 
integrate considerations of distributive justice into areas of environmental law 
that are otherwise treated in aggregative cost-benefit terms or governed by 
other considerations—notably, but not only, the setting and enforcement of 
pollution limits and the siting of hazardous facilities. A second key point of the 
environmental justice perspective is that the scope of “environmental” 
questions is not self-defining; the category’s boundaries are established by legal 
and institutional work, from legislation to the creation and definition of the 
44.4 PURDY V2 FOR JCI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/3/18  1:07 PM 
2018] THE LONG ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 811 
major institutions of environmental advocacy and expertise. This work, along 
with political discourse and social movements, makes and remakes the 
contested meanings of “environment.” 
The themes of environmental justice are perennially important, but they 
are particularly pertinent today, for two rather different reasons. First is a 
reopening and intensification of problems related to distributive justice, broadly 
understood. We now recognize that the period of economic history in which 
today’s “mainstream environmentalism” took shape was a historical anomaly. 
A new history of economic inequality has emerged in the last decade-plus, 
most visibly in Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century.1 The 
upshot of this work is that inequality has grown substantially in the last forty-
plus years, with both income and wealth accumulating in the very highest 
echelons. Moreover, substantial and growing inequality has turned out to be the 
norm, rather than the exception, for most of the last two centuries. The most 
prominent exception is the thirty-year period following World War II. This 
discovery suggests that certain patterns of thought and practice that emerged in 
that anomalous period may be products, not just of an exceptional time, but of 
the mistaken supposition that it was no anomaly at all that economic inequality 
had become a problem of the past.2 This point is particularly relevant to the 
relationship to distributive justice to environmental law at large, in light of 
environmental law’s emergence in the last anomalous years of widely shared 
growth, the first half of the 1970s. Environmental law turns out to be deeply 
shaped by the presupposition that trends toward economic equality, rather than 
inequality, represented a “new normal.” 
Second, the environmental justice commitment to an expansive conception 
of “environment,” including institutions, built settings, and the social allocation 
of resources, suits a moment when it is clearer than ever that there is no stable 
or uncontroversial boundary between the social and the natural, nor any 
creditable way to identify certain issues as inherently “environmental.” Many 
earth scientists and other scholars contend that we have entered “the 
Anthropocene,” a portmanteau term for a new geological “age of humanity” in 
which human beings have become a force—perhaps the dominant force—
shaping the planet. In this view, environmental law is an aspect of world 
making, part of a choice among futures in dimensions ranging from the 
chemistry of the global atmosphere to the mix of species in existence to the 
pattern of landscapes.3 Because what we still tend to call “the natural world” is 
 
 1.  THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 113–467 (Arthur Goldhammer 
trans., 2014) (analyzing economic inequality over the past two centuries). 
 2.  See Jedediah Purdy, Wealth and Democracy, in 58 NOMOS – AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, WEALTH 235–60 (Jack Knight & Elizabeth Schwartzberg eds., 
2017) (setting out this history and some of its implications for law and politics). 
 3.  See generally JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE 
(2015) (articulating this idea and relating it to the growth and current state of environmental law).  
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a joint production of human activity and nonhuman forces, the boundaries of 
what is “environmental” are not straightforward. 
Environmental law nonetheless carries forward conceptions of “the 
environment” and the role of distributive considerations in managing it that 
formed in a particular moment, roughly the 1960s and early 1970s in the United 
States, when a set of problems were newly grouped together under the label 
“environmental”: pesticides and other toxins (but more as they affected “third 
parties” than in their effects on agricultural workers); nuclear fallout (but not 
other side effects of geopolitical conflict, such as the global proliferation of 
inexpensive automatic weapons); litter (but not the decrepit condition of public 
institutions in neglected neighborhoods); urban congestion and sprawl (but not 
the prevalence of asthma or diabetes in poor communities); biodiversity (but 
not yet the diversity of crops in agriculture and their relation to larger patterns 
of ecological health); and the management of public lands (but not the 
condition of public infrastructure). 
Modern environmental law is very substantially the product of a burst of 
legislation and institution-building that took place between the end of the 1960s 
and the beginning of the 1980s. President Richard M. Nixon signed the 
National Environmental Policy Act on January 1, 1970, created the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in December of that year, and signed 
the Clean Air Act (CAA) on New Year’s Eve.4 In the ten years that followed, 
Congress passed, among other statutes, the Clean Water Act (CWA),5 the 
Endangered Species Act,6 laws governing the use and disposal of pesticides 
and other toxic substances,7 comprehensive reform of federal public-lands 
management,8 and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.9 This 
period of law making closed out with the 1980 adoption of the toxic-waste 
 
 4.  National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321‒4347 (2012)); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 
Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401‒7671q); Reorganization Plan No. 3, 35 Fed. Reg. 
15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 202 (2012), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) (establishing 
the EPA).   
 5.  Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251‒1387 (2012)) (colloquially known as the “Clean Water 
Act”). 
 6.  Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1531‒1544 (2012)). 
 7.  Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as 
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136‒136y (2012)) (amending the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act); Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601‒2629 (2012)); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. 
L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901‒6987). 
 8.  Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701‒1787); National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614). 
 9.  Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 
445 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201‒1328 (2012)). 
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cleanup law commonly known as Superfund.10 Congress passed the 1970s 
statutes by margins that today suggest typographic errors: only 1 vote against 
the 1970 CAA in all of Congress; average votes of 76 to 5 in the Senate and 
331 to 30 in the House for major environmental statutes.11 The new laws 
greatly expanded the federal government’s regulation of private industry and 
land use, from smokestacks and waste disposal to wetlands management and 
pest control. New environmental statutes also transformed the federal 
government’s management of the land it controls directly, more than a quarter 
of the country’s acreage, by requiring new attention to ecological principles and 
making biodiversity lexically superior to other goals in some circumstances.12 
The same years saw the formation of the advocacy organizations and 
centers of professional expertise that do much to shape environmental law. The 
Environmental Law Institute, the key professional clearinghouse for the field, 
was founded in 1969, and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 
arguably the touchstone modern environmental group, was created in 1970. The 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) and the think-tank Resources for the 
Future already existed but were substantially built up in these years, when they 
moved their previous science-and-policy missions toward the emerging field of 
environmental law, as defined by the post-1970 statutes. Longstanding 
organizations such as the Sierra Club became mass-membership groups and 
built up litigation arms that followed NRDC’s example.13 
The ways that environmental law was institutionalized in this period—in 
statutes and agencies, but also in professional and advocacy organizations—
matter because the precise contours of “environmental” problems have always 
been contested.14 The field lacks the textual basis of constitutional law, the 
 
 10.  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601‒9675). 
 11.  RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 69 (2004). 
 12.  The Endangered Species Act obliges the federal government to avoid action that 
“jeopardize[s]” listed species, while the National Forest Management Act enhances the conservation and 
ecological elements of federal forest management. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 7, 87 Stat. at 892 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536); National Forest Management Act of 1976 § 2, 90 Stat. at 
2949–50 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1600). The National Environmental Policy Act’s 
application to “major” federal actions also required significant new attention to such questions. National 
Environmental Policy Act § 102, 83 Stat. at 853 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4332). 
 13.  These developments are discussed in Parts II.C and IV.C, infra. 
 14.  I have developed this argument, which forms the methodological starting point of this Article, 
in three previous articles. See Jedediah Purdy, Our Place in the World: A New Relationship for 
Environmental Ethics and Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 857, 883–905 (2013) (arguing that political contests over 
the scope and purposes of environmental law substantially account for the question of which ethical 
frameworks have application in the field); Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in 
Environmental Law, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 215–25 (2012) (mapping statutes, doctrinal 
disputes, and political conflicts over environmental questions onto a typology of environmental 
worldviews that are embodied or exemplified in certain eras of law making in the field); Jedediah Purdy, 
The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 
1125–32 (2010) (arguing for the primacy of a politically achieved definition of scope and priorities of 
environmental law, in hindsight and prospectively). I also developed this argument in After Nature: A 
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clear topical remit of tax or antitrust, and the doctrinal coherence of contract or 
tort. Built on a variety of agency-spanning statutes, addressed to problems that 
might be gathered under the slogan “everything is connected,” it has always 
oscillated between a sense of self-evidence—of course these problems are 
environmental!—and a propensity to identity crisis.15 Do environmental 
problems centrally include the threat of nuclear conflict and the question of 
population policy, as a landmark statement by major environmental groups 
suggested in 1985?16 Do environmental concerns imply engagement with 
immigration policy, as many Sierra Club members and leaders argued during a 
notorious and movement-defining conflict in the 1990s and thereafter?17 Do 
they centrally concern the governance of food systems, which did not figure 
much in early formulations of environmental law, but have attracted eager 
attention in recent years?18 These questions are not likely to find conceptual or 
empirical resolution. Answers come instead from the network of laws, public 
and nonprofit institutions, and movements whose efforts form the field of 
environmental law. 
This Article offers a reassessment of a defining contest over the scope and 
priorities of environmental law that emerged in the 1970s and early 1980s. The 
catalyst for this contest was the critique of “mainstream environmentalism” in a 
series of challenges that, taken together, formed a movement and school of 
thought called “environmental justice.” Environmental justice advocates 
charged mainstream environmentalism with indifference to the distributive 
consequences of environmental policy, especially where the burdens of 
pollution and other harms followed familiar racial and socioeconomic lines of 
vulnerability and marginalization; parochial attachment to a woods-and-waters 
version of the core problems of environmental law, in which humans, 
especially socially vulnerable people, were too often secondary; and excessive 
 
Politics for the Anthropocene. See generally PURDY, supra note 3. This paper falls within the sequence 
of that earlier work.  
 15.  Although the EPA administers a great deal of environmental law, significant responsibility 
also falls to the Department of Interior (the Fish and Wildlife Service administers most of the 
Endangered Species Act; the Bureau of Land Management and National Park Service are responsible for 
much public-lands policy; and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement administers 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act), the Department of Agriculture (which contains the 
Forest Service, which is responsible for the national forests, and takes lead responsibility for shaping 
farmers’ land use through subsidies and conservation programs), the Department of Commerce (which is 
responsible for fisheries management and the application of the Endangered Species Act to marine life), 
the Army Corps of Engineers (which administers and enforces permits to fill wetlands and waterways, in 
conjunction with the EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (overseeing safety in the food 
system, which, as this paper discusses later, has increasingly entered the circle of environmental 
concerns). For a reflection on the multifariousness of environmental law, see generally J.B. Ruhl & 
James Salzman, Climate Change Meets the Law of the Horse, 62 DUKE L.J. 975 (2013). 
 16.  See JOHN H. ADAMS ET AL., AN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 25–39 (1985). 
 17.  See Felicity Barringer, Bitter Division for Sierra Club on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/16/us/bitter-division-for-sierra-club-on-immigration.html?_r 
=0. 
 18.  See infra Part V. 
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comfort with elite and professionalized advocacy, in contrast to the popular 
mobilization and participation that were central to other social movements in 
the 1960s and 1970s.19 
The environmental justice movement (more accurately, movements) made 
incisive points about the limitations and blind spots of mainstream 
environmentalism. But for mainstream environmentalism to attract these 
critiques, something else had to happen first: the retreat of environmental 
politics from an earlier and long-running engagement with issues of power and 
justice in the human environment. The mainstream environmentalism that 
attracted the key early environmental justice critiques had emerged not long 
before from a “great forgetting,” an eclipse of strands of environmentalism 
concerned centrally with justice, power, and the human setting writ large.20 
Recalling what was eclipsed is the beginning of recovering a long 
environmental justice movement. 
Environmentalism’s “great forgetting” happened in two stages. First, in 
the 1950s and 1960s, key activists and organizations, signally Rachel Carson 
and the Wilderness Society, forged a contemporary environmentalism from an 
earlier, multifarious set of research, reform, and activist agendas, many of them 
concerned with urban neighborhoods, industrial health, and economic power. 
The result was a relatively narrow definition of “environmental” concerns that 
flowered in the late 1960s and early 1970s, both informing the major 
environmental statutes and institutions and, in a pattern of mutual support, 
finding confirmation in them. The institutions and agendas that become central 
in this period often reflected a then-leading view of the role of legal advocacy 
in social reform. This was an idealistic but also distinctly apolitical stance that I 
call “legal liberalism,” which the Ford Foundation played a key role in 
institutionalizing in the new environmental groups, and which consolidated a 
distinctly elite and technocratic profile for the movement. 
Although the decisions of advocates and organizations were important in 
this development, the narrowing of environmentalism’s scope was also enabled 
by a larger set of historical conditions. The mid-twentieth century was marked 
by relatively egalitarian distribution of both income and wealth, which fostered 
the impression that economic inequality was a problem substantially solved. 
This, in turn, supported a certain complacency about the distributional 
consequences of environmental law that environmental justice advocates would 
 
 19.  This last point has seemed especially ironic because mass mobilization was present at the 
beginning of modern environmentalism, when, in 1970, more than ten million Americans participated in 
the first Earth Day. See RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING 
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 225–26 (2006). 
 20.  With this term, I am indicating the resonance between this argument and the historical 
interpretation that Joseph Fishkin and William Forbath have advanced in their manuscript on the “great 
forgetting” of egalitarian constitutional political economy during the period after the New Deal. See 
Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy: An Introduction to 
the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 1295–98 (2016) 
(advancing their interpretation of the “great forgetting”). 
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later highlight. The demotion of distributive considerations, workplace 
conditions, and other issues of power and social disparity among the priorities 
of environmentalism did not reflect indifference to those questions per se, but 
rather the conviction that environmental law and policy could take for granted 
that other forces would address those questions independently. 
The second stage of narrowing and forgetting happened once the new 
environmental statutes were enacted and environmental advocacy and 
professional institutions were up and running. Throughout the 1970s, there 
were opportunities for environmental law and advocacy to join forces with 
social movements that linked “environmental” questions with racial justice, 
neighborhood health, workplace organization, and economic power. None of 
these opportunities came to fruition. It was not really until the end of the 1970s 
or beginning of the 1980s that “mainstream environmentalism” was 
institutionally consolidated in the form that the environmental justice 
movement criticized. It took lasting form just in time to be criticized as the 
avatar of a perennial (and parochial) environmentalism. 
Why should we care? There is a gain in clarity in understanding the ways 
that certain institutions and intellectual practices that we take for granted 
because we were born into them are, in fact, the products of an anomalous 
twentieth-century exception to the longstanding place of economic inequality in 
American legal and political contests.21 But understanding the context in which 
the contrast between “mainstream environmentalism” and environmental 
justice arose is only the beginning of a conjoined project of historical recovery 
and contemporary reorientation. Much as students of law and social movements 
have come to appreciate the “long civil rights movement,” and have been 
reminded of the long and multifarious history of the labor movement outside 
the structure of the National Labor Relations Act, historical reorientation here 
reveals a long movement for environmental justice.22 The value of recognizing 
 
 21.  See, e.g., David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Inequality Rediscovered, 18 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 61, 68–70 (2017) (advancing the argument that conventional divisions between public and 
private law and features of substantive areas such as constitutional law and antitrust are products of the 
great exception); Jedediah Purdy, Overcoming the Great Forgetting: A Comment on Fishkin and 
Forbath, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1415, 1416–17 (2016) (locating the revival of a left-leaning “constitutional 
political economy” in the new awareness of long-term trends in economic inequality); David Singh 
Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 
2014, at 1, 21–23 (arguing that the critical political economy of law implied in the concept of 
“neoliberalism” takes fresh relevance from new awareness of economic inequality).  
 22.  See, e.g., ADRIANE LENTZ-SMITH, FREEDOM STRUGGLES: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND WORLD 
WAR I 2–4 (2009) (arguing for the importance of the First World War as a crucible of black activism and 
resistance); MARTHA BIONDI, TO STAND AND FIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN POSTWAR 
NEW YORK CITY (2003) (describing black resistance to various forms of second-class citizenship in the 
1940s and early 1950s as an alternative history of postwar civil rights); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long 
Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233, 1235–61 (2005) 
(describing the long black freedom movement, the specific form of it that became the mid-century Civil 
Rights Movement, and the subsequent hindsight contest over the meaning of that movement). On labor, 
see ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH: LABOR AND 
REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 97–137 (2015) (tracing a long history of “labor 
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the long environmental justice movement is akin to that of other (re)discoveries 
of “long” histories. It highlights that the familiar form of that movement, and 
the body of law with which we associate it, is a relatively recent creation, and a 
selective one, which foregrounds certain themes of the long movement and 
neglects or obscures others. A long history of a movement may become a 
source of a usable past: roads not taken or long overgrown may suggest future 
paths. 
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents the rise in the 
1980s of a movement and body of scholarship under the rubric of 
environmental justice, with particular attention to grassroots anti-toxics 
campaigns and mobilization against racially disparate hazards, especially in the 
siting of waste facilities. It characterizes the core critique of “mainstream” 
environmental law from the environmental justice perspective: its relative 
indifference to distributive questions, its attachment to a narrow conception of 
“the environment,” and its comfort with elite and professionalized forms of 
advocacy. Part II seeks to account for these omissions and deficiencies in 
mainstream environmental law by situating the creation of the statutes and 
institutions that constitute much of that law within three defining phenomena of 
the 1960s and early 1970s: the existence and expectation of relatively equitable 
distribution of income and wealth; legal liberalism’s culture of professionalized 
and heavily procedural advocacy, particularly influential in the Ford 
Foundation’s involvement in forming environmental-law institutions; and the 
capacity to found Equal Protection suits on disparate impacts from facially 
neutral laws, which provided a potential check on structural inequality before 
the Supreme Court rejected such actions in 1976 and the years immediately 
following. Together, these help to explain why legislators such as Maine 
Senator Edmund Muskie, a leading architect of the CAA, both showed great 
sensitivity to environmental justice themes and failed to integrate distributive 
fairness into the statutes they wrote. In light of contemporaneous expectations, 
these statutes struck their authors as being environmental justice laws; that 
context, however, did not long survive their enactment. 
Part III shows that there would have been nothing alien to twentieth-
century environmentalism in engaging issues of distribution, economic power, 
or political accountability. On the contrary, such iconic sources of mainstream 
environmentalism as the Wilderness Society and the industrial toxicology 
movement that underlay Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring were intensely 
concerned with these themes, which were eclipsed during a thematic 
compression of “environmentalism” during the 1960s. I speculate that this 
 
republicanism” that linked control of economic life with self-government generally, giving special 
attention to the decades after the Civil War); MICHAEL KAZIN, THE POPULIST PERSUASION: AN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 49–78 (1995) (exploring the Knights of Labor and nineteenth-century labor 
radicalism); James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 962–66 (1997) 
(describing labor activists’ conception of the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, in particular for 
their program). 
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compression had to do with the political and cultural would-be consensus of the 
Cold War, as well as expectation of relatively egalitarian economic growth. 
Part IV shows that even in the 1970s, as the statutes and institutions of 
mainstream environmental law were being built up in the form that the 
environmental justice movement came to criticize, there were other, more 
egalitarian and grassroots strands of environmental politics, notably both 
established and insurgent labor-union voices and Nader-ite advocacy 
organizations. It was not until the 1980s that the agenda of mainstream 
environmentalism reached its most uncontentious and homogeneous form—and 
environmental justice claimants arose to challenge and diversify it. Part V 
brings the commitments of the long environmental justice movement into the 
present as a lens to consider the emerging issue of food systems, taking this as a 
model for integration of justice with more conventional environmental 
concerns. A brief conclusion follows. 
I.  THE RISE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
In roughly the last two decades, environmental justice has become an 
integral aspect of environmental law and politics. A set of premises distinguish 
environmental justice, as a perspective and as a movement, from the 
“mainstream environmentalism” that is associated with the shaping and passage 
of major environmental statutes between 1970 and 1977, and with the advocacy 
organizations that emerged in that period, such as NRDC and EDF.23 One 
premise concerns the scope of problems that should be conceived of as 
“environmental.” As Sheila Foster and the late Luke Cole put it, “the 
environment is where we live, where we work, where we play, and where we 
learn”—in other words, neighborhoods, workplaces, and public institutions, in 
addition and in contrast to traditional environmentalism’s focus on such 
“natural” phenomena as waterways, forests, and nonhuman species.24 This is a 
distinctly social and institutional definition of “environment,” in which the 
artificial human habitat figures equally with the natural one. A second defining 
premise of environmental justice is that environmental policies should be 
assessed in light of their distributive consequences, particularly where the 
distribution of environmental harms and benefits tracks other contours of socio-
economic inequality, such as race and class.25 By contrast, Cole and Foster 
 
 23.  One might add the Sierra Club, which was founded in 1892 but underwent significant 
membership growth and expansion of its mission in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
 24.  LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND 
THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 16 (2001). Luke Cole, an environmental justice 
lawyer who died in a car accident in Uganda in 2009, is admiringly remembered in the environmental 
justice community. 
 25.  As Michael Gerrard puts it, while there is “no universally accepted definition of 
environmental justice,” a strong candidate for a core overlapping idea is “that minority and low-income 
individuals, communities, and populations should not be disproportionately exposed to environmental 
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write, “the traditional environmental law community has largely ignored” these 
questions, partly because of a cultural attachment to a narrow definition of 
environmental topics, partly owing to “[r]acism and other prejudices.”26 A third 
premise is that environmental decision making should be inclusive. Whether 
this means regarding political participation as a potentially transformative site 
of community empowerment or asserting the humbler principle that vulnerable 
communities “should share fully in making the decisions that affect their 
environment,” it stands in contrast to traditional environmentalism’s comfort 
with specialized advocacy in judicial and administrative forums.27 
The theoretical commitments that characterize the perspective of 
environmental justice also express its origins in community activism. More 
specifically, environmental justice claims have important roots in two 
developments of the late 1970s and the 1980s: the toxics movement and the rise 
of civil rights-style mobilization around “environmental racism.” The toxics 
movement, a loose network of grassroots and often blue-collar anti-pollution 
campaigns, had its grim paradigm in the discovery that some 22,000 barrels of 
discarded toxic waste had entered the soil and water supply of residential 
neighborhoods and a public school in Love Canal, New York, visiting 
perceived high rates of leukemia, miscarriages, and chromosome damage on 
mostly working-class residents.28 Although they eventually drew the support of 
the Carter Administration and helped to spur the passage of Superfund 
legislation, Lois Gibbs and her Love Canal neighbors were largely ignored by 
local officials and the Hooker Chemical Company during several years of 
grassroots investigative work and self-advocacy.29 Love Canal’s problems 
became emblematic as communities around the country confronted the buried, 
 
hazards[.]” THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS 
DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS xxxiii (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 26.  COLE & FOSTER, supra note 24, at 30; see also EDWARDO LAO RHODES, ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A NEW PARADIGM 30 (2003) (“[M]ainstream environmental organizations have 
tended to focus on things, rather than people. People have been treated almost as a homogenous mass: if 
one benefits, all benefit.”). Although Rhodes sets aside as “too simplistic” the view that “the mainstream 
environmental movement is simply racist and too middle-class” to address environmental justice 
concerns, he argues for a culturally essentializing historical view of the environmental movement as 
marked by an “antiurban bias” inherited from Romanticism, in which people “turned their backs on the 
cities and ran to the woods.” Id. at 35, 38. 
 27.  See THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 25; see also COLE & FOSTER, supra 
note 24, at 14–15 (offering the more ambitious view that “[i]ndividuals are transformed” and 
“communit[ies] [are] transformed” by environmental justice mobilization); id. at 28–30 (identifying the 
“traditional environmental movement” with elite and insider advocacy). 
 28.  Jedediah Purdy, Environmentalism for the Next Economy, in LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW 
ECONOMY: SUSTAINABLE, JUST, AND DEMOCRATIC 50, 58 (Melissa K. Scanlan ed., 2017). Subsequent 
epidemiological research has called into question whether these disorders were in fact markedly elevated 
in Love Canal, but have not diminished the emblematic significance of the place or the events identified 
with it. See, e.g., Lenore J. Gensburg et al., Cancer Incidence among Former Love Canal Residents, 117 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1265, 1269–70 (2009) (finding no significant difference between cancer rates in 
Love Canal and those for the general population of New York State for most types of cancer, and 
expressing uncertainty about causation, especially in light of small numbers).  
 29.  See Purdy, supra note 28, at 58.  
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often half-forgotten legacy of several decades of largely unregulated chemical 
waste disposal that followed World War II.30 
The problem was not restricted to legacy pollution. New regimes for 
dealing with both hazardous waste and ordinary municipal trash seemed to 
follow familiar lines of least political and economic resistance. Controversy 
around one siting decision is conventionally credited with raising the political 
profile of “environmental racism.” In 1982, North Carolina’s government 
selected a tract of state-owned land in Warren County, a rural, poor, and 
majority-black county in the state’s coastal plain, for disposal of soil 
contaminated by the illegal roadside dumping of 31,000 gallons of PCB-
contaminated oil. The oil’s owners had deposited it along some 240 miles of 
state roads rather than disposing of it in an approved facility. County residents 
did not succeed in stopping the landfill, but they drew national attention with 
protests that included blocking dump trucks with their bodies, and in which 
more than 500 people were arrested.31 Five years later, the Commission for 
Racial Justice of the United Church of Christ issued one of the canonical 
documents of environmental justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United 
States.32 The report presented evidence that hazardous waste facilities were 
disproportionately located in minority communities, and called this pattern a 
“form of racism.”33 Nearly three decades of subsequent research have split over 
the existence, degree, and sources of racially disproportionate hazards siting, 
but more refined methods have generally found correlation, and recent work 
suggests specific mechanisms of causation.34 
Both episodes saw popular mobilization arise outside the arrangements of 
official decision making and established advocacy organizations that had 
 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  COLE & FOSTER, supra note 24, at 21. 
 32.  COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987). 
 33.  Id. at x.  
 34.  Compare Paul Mohai & Robin Saha, Which Came First, People or Pollution? Assessing the 
Disparate Siting and Post-Siting Demographic Change Hypotheses of Environmental Injustice, 10 
ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, no. 11, 2015, at 1, 14–16, http://scholarworks.umt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1009&context=environstudies_pubs (finding disparities in siting decisions, which they argue are 
best explained by a combination of racial discrimination and “path of least resistance” political 
economy, in which neighborhoods already in racial transition are likely to lack political wherewithal to 
resist undesirable land uses), and John R. Hipp & Cynthia M. Lakon, Social Disparities in Health: 
Disproportionate Toxicity Proximity in Minority Communities over a Decade, 16 HEALTH & PLACE 674, 
680–82 (2010) (finding disparities in siting decisions), with Lori M. Hunter et al., Environmental 
Hazards, Migration, and Race, 25 POPULATION & ENV’T 23, 37 (2003) (not finding disparities in siting, 
a conclusion supporting the view that post-siting market dynamics account for disparities in 
demographics near hazardous sites). The debate over causation is obviously very important both for the 
issue of intentional discrimination and as a matter of the design of legal responses. It probably did not 
matter so much to many of the originators of “environmental racism” arguments, as they tended to see 
disparate impacts as a form of racial wrong, and to see market mediation as the typical form of unjust 
disparity.  
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emerged from the environmental law making and activism of the 1970s. The 
movements’ working-class and African American makeup sharply 
distinguished them from what the 1987 UCC report called traditional 
environmentalism’s “white middle and upper-class” constituency.35 The early 
environmental justice movements’ motives tended to be local, self-protective, 
and immediate; members felt themselves in danger of poisoning, and their 
requests for official attention had met indifferent response. Environmental 
justice activists did not appeal mainly to the costs-and-burdens balancing 
version of social rationality that was then taking a central place in the 
economics-oriented wing of mainstream environmentalism and among agency 
decision makers. Their argument was closer to the ground; whatever process 
had led to the dumping, concealment, or siting decision that immediately 
jeopardized them was suspect because of its fruits: a concretely felt threat that, 
typically, fit a pattern of social vulnerability and official indifference.36 
In the early 1990s, mainstream environmental institutions began to 
incorporate environmental justice themes. After a 1990 University of Michigan 
conference on “Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards,” a group of 
environmental justice activists and scholars met with EPA head William Reilly, 
who formed an “Environment and Equity” working group at the agency.37 Two 
years later, the working group filed an equivocal report, finding disparate 
exposure to pollution burdens among nonwhite populations, but raising a 
variety of questions about the sources of exposure and its relation to ultimate 
health problems.38 The report raised the ire of environmental justice critics, and 
Representative Henry Waxman of California denounced it as a “public relations 
ploy.”39 This exchange set up the environmental justice movement for a more 
satisfactory result two years later, in 1994, when President Clinton issued 
Executive Order 12898, which directs all federal agencies to “make achieving 
environmental justice part of [their] mission by identifying and addressing . . . 
 
 35.  COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, supra note 32, at xi.  
 36.  See COLE & FOSTER, supra note 24, at 12–13 (arguing for the importance of “grassroots 
experiences” in the environmental justice perspective). 
 37.  See ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., TOXIC WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY: 1987–2007, at 38 
(2007) (recounting the early history of “environmental racism” arguments and scholarship). 
 38.  EPA, EPA-230-R-92-008, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL 
COMMUNITIES 3 (1992). 
 39.  Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of 
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 804 n.64 (1993). In the same period, January 1990, 
environmental justice groups wrote an open letter to the major environmental advocacy groups, 
documenting their small share of nonwhite leaders and senior staffers. The letter, which also appeared in 
the New York Times in early February, prompted quick responses from some environmentalist leaders. 
Fred Krupp, executive director of EDF, confessed, “environmental groups have done a miserable job of 
reaching out to minorities.” DORCETA E. TAYLOR, THE STATE OF DIVERSITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 31‒33 (2014). Nonetheless, a follow-up study in 2014 found that over 88 percent of 
broadly defined “leadership positions” in environmental organizations were still occupied by white 
people. Id. at 50‒52.  
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disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects . . . 
on minority . . . and low-income populations.”40 
Executive Order 12898 is in itself a rather small victory on the stage of 
federal law. Its requirements are strictly procedural, and unlike other procedural 
duties that form important parts of environmental law practice, courts have held 
that the disparate impacts to which it draws agencies’ attention do not form the 
basis of individual causes of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.41 
The idea of environmental justice has, nonetheless, gained a significant 
foothold across environmental policy and politics. Many states have adopted 
environmental justice policies of various degrees of rigor.42 No environmental 
group or agency will profess indifference to environmental justice, and groups 
such as Earthjustice and NRDC have made significant commitments to it.43 
These commitments involve both substantive choice of cases and the 
procedures of attorney-client relations, which advocates, particularly but not 
 
 40.  Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
 41.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that disparate-impact 
regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act do not give rise to 
individual causes of action). By contrast, enforcement of planning and assessment requirements under 
the National Environmental Policy Act figures prominently in environmental litigation. See, e.g., 
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 795 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that 
petitioners sought to challenge the government’s predator damage management activities in Nevada and 
its failure to prepare a Nevada-specific environmental impact statement under the National 
Environmental Policy Act). 
 42.  California has adopted no fewer than nine statutes directing state agencies to attend to 
environmental justice concerns in their planning, and these have been enforced in individual suits. See, 
e.g., Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 203, 226–27 (Ct. 
App. 2004) (finding the environmental impact reports for proposed retail shopping centers to be 
deficient under the California Environmental Quality Act). Massachusetts prioritizes environmental 
justice communities (defined as those with relatively high levels of either minority residents or low-
income households) for cleanup funds, inspection, and enforcement under executive policy, and 
commits itself pointedly to a definition of “equal protection” as the principle that “no group of people, 
because of race, ethnicity, class, gender, or handicap bears an unfair share of environmental 
pollution . . . or have [sic] limited access to natural resources, including greenspace (open space) and 
water resources.” MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY AND ENVTL. AFFAIRS, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
POLICY OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 3 (Oct. 9, 2002), http://www.mass. 
gov/eea/docs/eea/ej/ej-policy-english.pdf. Many states’ policies roughly track the directive of Executive 
Order 12898. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629. 
 43.  See, e.g., Healthy Communities, EARTHJUSTICE, https://earthjustice.org/healthy-communities 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2017) (providing an overview of Earthjustice’s commitment to ensuring clean air 
and water, protecting people from pesticides, and generally safeguarding vulnerable communities from 
health threats); Environmental Justice, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/environmental-justice 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2017) (explaining the Sierra Club’s environmental justice mission to “discuss and 
explore the linkages between environmental quality and social justice, and to promote dialogue, 
increased understanding, and appropriate action”); Environmental Justice, NRDC, https://www.nrdc.org 
/about/environmental-justice (last visited Nov. 7, 2017) (including a list of dedicated attorneys); 
Environmental Justice Data Now Online for Every U.S. Community, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Apr. 18, 2001), 
https://www.edf.org/news/environmental-justice-data-now-online-every-us-community (detailing EDF’s 
program to accumulate and distribute data on geographic disparities in environmental hazards). While 
there are differences, and my subjective impression is that NRDC stands out in this respect, more than 
twenty years of being in and out of environmental movement spaces and among environmental law 
students tend to persuade me that heartfelt commitment to environmental justice is widespread.  
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only younger ones, have worked to make more collaborative with local 
communities than an older model that today’s attorneys describe in hindsight as 
“swooping down with an agenda.”44 Environmental justice claims have entered 
the lexicon of advocacy, where their uses range from mobilizing constituents to 
drawing media attention. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such claims have 
made a difference in more siting and funding disputes than a review of the 
Federal Register would reveal.45 
Environmental justice is now a part of environmental law and politics. Its 
practical consequences, however, have been somewhat uncertain and slow 
moving, while its import for the field as a whole remains ambiguous; is it a 
supplemental consideration mainly relevant to implementing familiar goals, or 
a continuing challenge to the identity and priorities of environmental law and 
politics? 
The argument that follows is that the importance of environmental justice 
in environmental law is not all it might be, and that examining the 
circumstances in which it emerged can illuminate why that is so. 
II.  SOURCES OF SILENCE: THE OMISSION OF JUSTICE FROM 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Environmental justice challenged “mainstream environmentalism” along 
several dimensions. It insisted on the importance of the distribution of benefits 
and burdens under the pollution-control statutes and other laws passed in the 
early 1970s at the opening of the modern era of environmental law. It criticized 
traditional environmentalism for taking “natural” places and systems as the 
paradigms of environmental concern, leaving at the periphery Cole and Foster’s 
places “where we live . . . work . . . play, and . . . learn.” Environmental justice 
advocates also criticized environmental organizations for their focus on and 
comfort with elite forms of advocacy driven by professional expertise, in 
contrast to popular participation and grassroots mobilization. Many of these 
critics regarded traditional environmentalism as both parochial and privileged, 
the inheritor of a woods-and-waters political aesthetic that led the Sierra Club 
in 1971 to describe incipient environmental justice concerns as “the 
 
 44.  Emails from Mitchell Bernard, Litig. Dir., Nat. Res. Def. Council, to author (July 2015) (on 
file with author). 
 45.  Already in 1994, pioneering environmental justice litigator Luke Cole argued that, because 
“the struggles in the environmental justice movement are primarily political and economic struggles, not 
legal ones,” even suits with poor prospects of technically prevailing could be worth bringing for 
purposes of mobilizing communities, attracting publicity, and framing structural disparities in 
environmental benefits and burdens as civil-rights issues, notwithstanding that the Supreme Court 
declined to treat them as denials of equal protection within the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Luke W. Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling, 21 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 523, 541–44 (1994). 
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conservation problems of such special groups as the urban poor and ethnic 
minorities.”46 
This conventional story is important but incomplete. The “traditional 
environmentalism” that served as the defining foil for environmental justice 
was neither timeless nor inevitable. It was the product of several distinctive 
features of American political economy, legal culture, and the environmental 
movement in the second half of the twentieth century. 
A.  The Post-War Anomaly and the Forgetting of Economic Inequality 
In the period from roughly 1946 to 1973, high levels of economic growth 
coincided with a relatively egalitarian distribution of income and wealth, 
producing the widely shared impression that economic inequality was a 
problem substantially solved.47 In this generation-long experience (and longer-
lasting perception) of inclusive growth as a “new normal,” political elites 
characterized the remaining challenges of economic disparity as problems of 
exclusion, not inequality. Certain marginalized populations, signally African 
Americans and Appalachian whites, were understood to have suffered 
exclusion from a system of general benefit on account of structural injustice 
and explicit discrimination, but those who were dealt into the system could 
expect to share in its benefits.48 From this perspective, economic participation, 
once purged of its exclusionary elements, should be expected to overcome, not 
reproduce, historical inequality. Thus, even in a time of great reformist energy, 
public-interested policy making could plausibly set aside most considerations 
 
 46.  COLE & FOSTER, supra note 24, at 30. The phrasing appeared in a survey of members, 58 
percent of whom responded that they either somewhat opposed or strongly opposed the Club’s 
concerning itself with such questions. Id.; see also RHODES, supra note 26, at 36–40.  
 47.  See PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 304–76 (advancing this finding). 
 48.  See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 76 (1958) (noting that “as an 
economic and social goal, inequality has been declining in urgency . . . [because of] increas[ed] 
production . . . [which is] an alternative to redistribution or even to the reduction of inequality. The 
oldest and most agitated of social issues, if not resolved, is at least largely in abeyance”); id. at 252–55 
(concluding, nonetheless, that “poverty does survive,” especially in the form of “insular poverty” 
characterized by an “island [where] everyone or nearly everyone is poor,” exemplified by black and 
white Southerners, “urban slum[s],” and Appalachia). As one piece of evidence for the persistence of 
this impression, Galbraith, in the original 1958 edition of The Affluent Society, flatly asserted that 
economic inequality was declining, and hung a great deal of his analysis on that fact. Id. at 76. In 
subsequent revisions through 1984, he acknowledged that his analysis could no longer be attributed to 
falling inequality, as it was in fact growing, and responded by amplifying the role of ancillary cultural 
and psychological considerations in his argument. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 
xxii–xxiv (4th ed. 1984) (highlighting his failure to foresee the “worsening balance” of private 
consumption to public services as seen in “the modern metropolis”); see also President Lyndon B. 
Johnson, Remarks at the University of Michigan (May 22, 1964) (“The Great Society”) (arguing that, 
after fifty years of “unbounded invention and untiring industry to create an order of plenty for all of our 
people,” the challenge was now “to use that wealth to enrich and advance our national life, and to 
advance the quality of our American civilization”); President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to 
the Congress on the State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964) (calling for a “war on poverty . . . in city slums and 
small towns, in sharecropper shacks or in migrant worker camps, on Indian Reservations, among whites 
as well as Negroes” and with special attention to “the chronically distressed areas of Appalachia”).  
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of distributive inequality in confidence that these would, so to speak, take care 
of themselves in a properly functioning economy. 
As environmental justice critics have charged, the major environmental 
statutes do not address the prospect that their benefits and burdens might turn 
out to be unequally distributed in ways that add to cumulative disadvantage. 
They do not provide measures to avert disparate impact, whether from siting 
hazardous activities in poor or nonwhite localities, market-mediated migration 
as people with money avoid environmental hazards and the poor end up 
clustered near them, or accumulation as today’s permissible levels of hazards 
interact with high baselines of toxicity or other dangers among vulnerable 
populations. 
What do these omissions reveal about the statutes and the attitudes of 
those who wrote them? The statutes’ authors were on notice of environmental 
justice concerns, and they did not ignore them. During debates on the CAA of 
1970, Senator Edmund Muskie, its chief architect, felt compelled to respond to 
a book-length “Nader Report” that took to task the government’s clean air 
policy and “palliative” solutions.49 The report, titled Vanishing Air, focused on 
“the environmental violence” suffered by severely polluted blue-collar 
communities, often in relatively economically marginal states such as West 
Virginia and Maine, in service of an argument that “air pollution is a new way 
of looking at an old American problem; concentrated and irresponsible 
corporate power.”50 Although Muskie’s response concentrated on defending 
the CAA’s national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) against the 
emissions-based standards that Nader favored, elsewhere in the spring of 1970, 
Muskie offered a more expansive picture of the social purpose of anti-pollution 
laws.51 On the first Earth Day, speaking in Philadelphia, he argued that “man’s 
environment includes more than . . . natural resources. It includes the shape of 
the communities in which he lives: his home, his schools, his places of 
work.”52 Arguing for protection of the “total environment,” he insisted that 
“the only kind of society that has a chance” is “a society that will not tolerate 
slums for some and decent houses for others, rats for some and playgrounds for 
others, clean air for some and filth for others.”53 Muskie linked the 
environmental crisis rhetorically to the War on Poverty, to the Great Society 
 
 49.  JOHN C. ESPOSITO & LARRY J. SILVERMAN, VANISHING AIR: THE RALPH NADER STUDY 
GROUP REPORT ON AIR POLLUTION 299–310 (1970) (contrasting solutions that address the “disparity” 
between people and polluters and mere “palliatives”). 
 50.  Id. at 293–94, 299; see also id. at 121–29 (detailing Union Carbide’s pollution in the Ohio 
Valley of West Virginia and the ineffectiveness and venality of local and state government’s 
involvement in enforcement efforts); id. at 294–98 (discussing pollution in New Cumberland, West 
Virginia, and Rumford, Maine).  
 51.  See 116 CONG. REC. 15,608 (1970) (memorializing a statement made by Sen. Muskie at a 
news conference on May 13, 1970); 120 CONG. REC. 11,324–25 (1974) (memorializing a speech made 
by Sen. Muskie on April 22, 1970, in Fairmount Park, Philadelphia). 
 52.  120 CONG. REC. 11,325.  
 53.  Id.  
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idea that the country’s challenge had changed from achieving prosperity to 
building widely shared flourishing within affluence, and to the Civil Rights 
Movement, concluding, “For Martin Luther King, every day was an Earth 
Day—a day to work toward his commitment to a whole society.”54 This was 
presumably the line of argument that Muskie had in mind the previous evening 
at Harvard’s Earth Day teach-in, where he said, “Those who believe that the 
environmental crisis [is] related to trees and not people are wrong. Those who 
believe that we are talking about the Grand Canyon and the Catskills, but not 
Harlem and Watts are wrong.”55 
Does the design of the major environmental statutes give the lie to these 
sentiments, or do the statutes represent a version of what its sponsors thought 
necessary to implement these ideas? The Senate Report on the CAA and 
Muskie’s floor statements in support of the bill suggest the latter. In hearings 
and in challenges from the Nader organizations, the Senate had heard several 
kinds of complaints about the distribution of environmental harms. One 
focused on lack of enforcement under previous anti-pollution legislation, 
especially in areas that were economically dependent on polluting industries: in 
line with the arguments of Vanishing Air, Representative Ken Hechler of West 
Virginia had given Muskie’s sub-committee a vivid rendition of Union 
Carbide’s evasion of regulatory efforts in the Ohio River Valley.56 Second was 
the charge, especially emphatic from the Nader groups, that the bill’s focus on 
NAAQS left too much room for administrative evasion, and should be replaced 
 
 54.  Id. Muskie had earlier compared the “war” on “poverty” and “hunger” with “another war” on 
“the pollution of our environment,” then insisted that only creating “a whole society,” in King’s sense, 
which he defined as a “healthy total environment,” could count as victory. Id. He also argued, in terms 
closely akin to those of Galbraith’s The Affluent Society, that “[o]ur technology has reached a point 
where it is producing more kinds of things than we really want, more kinds of things than we really 
need, and more kinds of things than we can really live with” and that this condition represented “a moral 
frontier” where material increase must be exchanged for a society “in which all men live in 
brotherhood . . . where each member of it knows that he has an opportunity to fulfill his greatest 
potential.” Id. 
 55.  116 CONG. REC. 15,705 (1970) (memorializing excerpts of a speech made by Sen. Muskie at 
Harvard University on April 21, 1970). Earlier that year, Senator Muskie made the same argument in a 
Chicago address: 
[M]an’s environment includes the shape of the communities in which he lives, his home, his 
schools, his places of work, his modes of transportation and his society. . . . [Our priorities 
should be reordered to address] [t]he economic imbalance which has caused the population 
shifts which now so deeply trouble our American cities. The adequacy of housing and 
services both in urban and rural America. The availability of health services. The 
conservation of natural resources. The availability of recreational opportunities in and around 
our cities . . . none of these can be said to be any less important or basically more important 
than the crisis of the environment. They are, indeed, a part of the environment. 
116 CONG. REC. 3527–28 (1970) (memorializing a speech made by Sen. Muskie in Chicago on January 
17, 1970)). 
 56.  Air Pollution Control and Solid Wastes Recycling: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Public 
Health & Welfare of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce on H.R. 12934, H.R. 14960, H.R. 
15137, H.R. 15192, H.R. 15848, and H.R. 15847, 91st Cong. 414‒40 (1970) (statement of Rep. Ken 
Hechler of West Virginia). 
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by technology-specific emissions standards that would drive down pollution 
more aggressively.57 Muskie seems to have understood NAAQS as providing 
an answer to both challenges. By setting a national standard, it would, in effect, 
create a universal right to clean air, not dependent on the conjunction of 
pollution sources in any particular locality. As Muskie explained in discussing 
“the philosophy of the bill,” the point was to establish a principle that “all 
citizens have an inherent right to the enjoyment of pure and uncontaminated air 
and water and soil.”58 The level of protection afforded by this statutory right, 
the Senate Report on the CAA emphasized, should be set at a level rigorous 
enough to protect even especially vulnerable populations, such as those 
suffering from emphysema or asthma, and the aged or very young.59 Although 
the guarantee of healthful air was, in form, a regulatory mandate rather than a 
right, it was made individually enforceable by the Act’s citizen-suit provision, 
which, the bill’s supporters argued, resolved questions about enforcement by 
empowering individuals affected by NAAQS violations to backstop agency 
enforcement with individual actions.60 A different approach, Muskie argued, 
would be “Russian roulette . . . with the trapped inhabitants of urban 
America.”61 
Of course, one does not have to take such political talk at face value, but a 
deliberately charitable interpretation in this case helps to reveal the lines of a 
worldview in which the CAA, as written, was already an environmental justice 
statute. Anti-pollution laws, in this view, formed part of a comprehensive 
approach to regulating what John Kenneth Galbraith had influentially called 
“the affluent society.”62 Muskie used the term in setting out the program of the 
CAA on the Senate floor, calling it a response to “the wasteful practices of an 
affluent society.”63 In this view, the anti-pollution statutes were part of a 
comprehensive renovation of the human “total environment,” alongside other 
programs of the Great Society and War on Poverty. The common goal was to 
 
 57.  In his foreword to Vanishing Air, Nader wrote, “The national ethic against air pollution must 
be translated into a policy of ‘maximum use of technology down to zero profits’ until corporations stop 
poisoning their neighbors’ habitat.” ESPOSITO & SILVERMAN, supra note 49, at ix. Muskie quoted this 
passage in his official reply to the Nader criticisms. See 116 CONG. REC. 15,609 (1970).  
 58.  116 CONG REC. 32,902‒03 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie). In his own words in 
introducing the bill, Muskie described its goal as being that “all Americans in all parts of the Nation 
should have clean air to breathe . . . that will have no adverse effects on their health.” Id. at 32,901. 
 59.  S. REP. NO. 91-1196, at 7, 10‒11 (1970). 
 60.  Id. at 36‒39 (explaining that the objective character of the NAAQS standards would make 
citizen suits tractable for courts, and thus enforce consistent policy across the country). Muskie made the 
same point in a floor debate while answering a challenge to the citizen-suit provision. See 116 CONG. 
REC. 32,902‒03, 32,926‒27 (arguing that the bounds of a citizen suit were made objective by the 
NAAQS standards, and that such suits would form an essential complement to agency enforcement in 
creating a consistent national policy). Strictly speaking, citizen suits do not directly enforce NAAQS, 
but rather demand enforcement action against polluters in violation of emissions permits that are, in 
turn, keyed to the NAAQS. 
 61.  116 CONG. REC. 32,906 (statement of Sen. Muskie).  
 62.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 63.  116 CONG. REC. 32,900 (statement of Sen. Muskie). 
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overcome social and economic isolation, especially clusters of persistent 
poverty, and build up institutions that promoted learning and development.64 
Establishing individually enforceable national standards for healthful air and 
water played a key part in this program, as did controlling toxins. But those 
measures could rely on others in the larger program when it came to 
distributing the hazards that would still have to be allocated, from hazardous 
waste facilities to persistent air and water pollution. The basic insight of 
environmental justice—that absent specific protections, these persistent 
burdens will be distributed along familiar lines of race and poverty—is weighty 
in proportion to the intensity of those other forms of inequality. Reformers in 
1970 expected those forms of inequality to give way to a combination of 
egalitarian macroeconomic tendencies and inclusive and redistributive policies. 
Although it may seem clear in hindsight that Nixon-era retrenchment had 
already begun as the major environmental laws were passed, Muskie instead 
took the view of Joseph Califano, President Johnson’s principal aid for 
domestic policy. Califano argued in 1968 that the Johnson years had “cleared 
the liberal agenda”; that conservatives, too, were now interventionists and 
redistributionists in matters ranging from affirmative action and day care to 
proposals for a basic income; and that the important question was how to carry 
forward, not just piecemeal legislation, but what Muskie called “a reshaping of 
our basic political institutions and . . . a reshaping of our thinking about 
them.”65 In this view, the challenge of the time was to follow the lead of 
events, both macroeconomic and political, in the direction of greater economic 
and social equality. 
Soon the political turn against the regulatory and redistributionist state 
would become more apparent. Moreover, at roughly the time the major 
environmental laws were passing through Congress with huge majorities, 
economic inequality began its forty-year increase.66 In their time, though, the 
 
 64.  See supra text accompanying note 48 (discussing “The Great Society” and “war on poverty” 
programs).  
 65.  114 CONG. REC. 11,158‒60 (1968) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (inserting into the record a 
speech by Joseph A. Califano delivered before the Nieman Fellows of Harvard University on April 23, 
1968). Muskie repeatedly sounded this note about the environmental statutes, describing them as 
paradigm-shifting changes in the duties as well as the rights of citizenship. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 
36,872, 36,874 (1972) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“The whole intent of [the Clean Water Act] is to 
make a national commitment, . . . ‘Can we afford clean water? . . . Can we afford life itself?’ . . . Those 
questions were never asked as we destroyed the waters of our Nation, and they deserve no answers as 
we finally move to restore and renew them. These questions answer themselves. And those who say that 
raising the amounts of money called for in this legislation may require higher taxes, or . . . contribute to 
inflation simply do not understand the language of this crisis.”); see also 116 CONG. REC. 42,392 (1970) 
(statement of Sen. Muskie) (“There has to be a commitment to [clean air] by every citizen, not only with 
respect to the activities of others, but with respect to each citizen himself . . . .”). 
 66.  See PIKETTY, supra note 1, at 291 fig. 8.5 (showing income inequality in the United States 
from 1910 to 2010 with a sharp increase beginning in the mid-to-late 1970s); id. at 348 fig. 10.5 
(showing wealth inequality in the United States for a timeline spanning from 1810 to 2010).  
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major environmental statutes incorporated their architects’ expectations that the 
laws would operate within a general movement toward greater equality. 
B.  Disparate Impact and the Problem of Constitutional Remedies 
Second, the period between the passage of many of the major 
environmental statutes in 1970–77 and the rise of the environmental justice 
movement in the 1980s coincided with the Supreme Court’s rejection of 
disparate-impact claims under the Equal Protection Clause and adoption of the 
requirement that equal-protection plaintiffs demonstrate “discriminatory 
purpose” by an official actor.67 Several early environmental justice suits were 
turned away by courts precisely for their failure to show discriminatory intent, 
even in cases of dramatically disparate distribution of environmental harms.68 
Thus, those who wrote the environmental laws of 1970–77 had some reason to 
believe that, where the statutes failed to achieve a reasonably equitable 
distribution of burdens, litigants could call on courts to review policies with 
racially disparate effects. 
The requirement to demonstrate discriminatory intent altered the remedial 
landscape for plaintiffs whose disparate burdens arose from the interaction of 
facially neutral statutes with background conditions of economic and racial 
inequality. Even at the time of Washington v. Davis, which announced the 
requirement of purposeful discrimination and declined to base a finding of such 
discrimination solely on evidence of disparate impact, it was not clear that the 
courts would give the doctrine the strict formulation that it later received.69 The 
lead opinion by Justice White focused on the institutional particulars of the 
District of Columbia police department, and Justice Stevens, concurring, 
argued that “the common-law presumption” that actors are responsible for the 
foreseeable effects of their actions should govern disparate-impact claims.70 It 
was because of this doctrinal development that environmental justice plaintiffs 
were thrown on the environmental statutes as their primary source of remedies, 
and so were confronted with those statutes’ facial indifference to the economic 
and racial distribution of whatever hazards they did not ban outright. It says 
 
 67.  See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278 (1979) (holding that where a law 
has a foreseeable disparate impact, it must have been passed because of, not despite of, that impact, i.e., 
it must have been motivated by or aimed at the disparate impact); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
239 (1976) (finding no equal protection claim from a showing of disparate racial impact absent evidence 
of purposeful discrimination by an official actor).  
 68.  See, e.g., R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding that a 
community organization failed to establish that placement of a landfill in a predominately black area of 
the county resulted from intentional discrimination); East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass’n v. Macon-
Bibb Cty. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 896 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Bean v. Sw. 
Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 681 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff’d mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(same). 
 69.  See Davis, 426 U.S. at 246–48. 
 70.  See id. (discussing the D.C. Police Department’s recruitment practices); id. at 252–69 
(Stevens, J., concurring). 
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something about how abruptly the world the environmental reformers took for 
granted was stripped from them that a number of civil-rights lawyers continued 
well into the 1980s to couch environmental justice suits as Equal Protection 
claims based on disparate impact. While the growth of economic inequality 
returned and political support for Great Society-style programs collapsed, the 
constitutional means for addressing the predictable effects of persistent and 
growing inequality and the disparate effects of facially neutral policies 
disappeared from the United States Reports. 
This intersection between the environmental and racial-justice areas, in the 
domains of both law and movements, suggests a larger point about the 
emergence of environmental justice. In 1970, the radical black scholar Nathan 
Hare articulated the later-canonical arguments of environmental justice in a 
polemical essay in The Black Scholar.71 Hare argued that “the reformist 
solutions tendered by the current ecology movement” were “somewhat 
ludicrous from the black perspective” but that nonetheless “[t]he emergence of 
the concept of ecology in American life is potentially of momentous relevance 
to the ultimate liberation of black people.”72 Hare argued that the key was to 
understand that “ecology” for many black people meant a residential and 
workplace environment with disproportionate concentrations of conventional 
pollution, but also, and just as important, intolerable levels of crowding, noise, 
vermin, exposure to workplace accidents, and risk of violent crime.73 While the 
“white ecology” of “mainstream environmentalism” was indifferent to these 
problems in Hare’s telling, a more thoroughgoing ecological analysis would 
show that “[n]o solution to the ecology crisis can come without a fundamental 
change in the economics of America particularly with reference to blacks,” and, 
indeed, “[t]he real solution to the environmental crisis is the decolonization of 
the black race.”74 I have not found evidence that Hare’s formulation reached 
more mainstream and legally consequential debates. Nonetheless, Hare’s 
argument is a reminder that the environmental justice movement arose in 
conversation with an argument in the long black freedom struggle about what 
kind of equality might suffice as redress for the situation of black Americans. 
Five years before Hare wrote, Bayard Rustin, a close ally of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and an organizer of the 1963 March on Washington, had already 
called the drive for formal equality of the desegregation period the “classical” 
phase of the civil rights movement, a term historian Jacqueline Hall would 
 
 71.  Nathan Hare, Black Ecology, BLACK SCHOLAR, Apr. 1970, at 2. 
 72.  Id. at 2, 7.  
 73.  See id. at 4. Besides arguing for treating all of these as vectors of ecological harm, Hare 
adapted conventional studies of urban poverty to an environmental vocabulary, quoting accounts of 
malnutrition from the iconic proposal for a national basic income, Poverty Amid Plenty, and 
characterizing these as a “form of pollution.” Id. at 6; see also THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON INCOME 
MAINT. PROGRAMS, POVERTY AMID PLENTY: THE AMERICAN PARADOX 16–17 (1969).  
 74.  Hare, supra note 71, at 2, 7, 8. 
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adopt forty years later in writing of the “long” civil rights movement.75 Rustin 
went on to argue that to succeed, the movement would have to move on to 
economic reconstruction, from “equal opportunity” to substantive “equality.”76 
The environmental justice movement carried Rustin’s case for economic 
reconstruction into the domain of environmental law at a time when the 
distance between formally equal treatment and substantive reconstruction was 
growing anew. 
C.  Legal Liberalism and the Institutionalization of Environmental Law 
Both the environmental statutes and the environmental movement that 
took form in the 1970s and early 1980s bore the stamp of a conception of law’s 
role in legal and social reform that was regnant among elite reformers in the 
1960s and 1970s. Steven Teles has termed this view “legal liberalism” and 
linked it with a more general view of the law’s role in a democratic society.77 
Legal liberalism was defined by its emphasis on the use of litigation and 
adjudication-like procedures to protect individuals against arbitrary 
discrimination with respect to their basic interests—that is, to ensure the formal 
preconditions of their full participation in political, economic, and social 
institutions. It implied a central but also quite specifically delimited role for 
legal advocacy, focused on securing formal rights and procedural attention for 
those who lacked organized voice backed by money or institutional heft, such 
as the disorganized poor and consumers.78 
Legal liberalism took plausibility from the distributional optimism of the 
mid-twentieth century: its procedural emphases made sense on the view that 
formally equal and open economic participation overcame rather than 
 
 75.  Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement, 
COMMENTARY, Feb. 1965, at 25. For the use of “classical,” see Hall, supra note 22, at 1251. 
 76.  Rustin, supra note 75. 
 77.  See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE 
FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 22‒57 (2008) (describing “the rise of the liberal legal network”). The term is 
also associated with Laura Kalman’s The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism. Kalman uses the term to 
refer to a series of scholarly and institutional developments in which legal scholars sought to justify, 
preserve, and expand the reformist jurisprudence of the Warren Court (and to some extent the early 
Burger Court, in cases such as Roe v. Wade). Laura Kalman’s THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL 
LIBERALISM 60–93 (1996). Teles refers to a different phenomenon—the central place that legal 
institutions, practice, and concepts achieved in the institutional and intellectual life of center-left reform 
movements between the late 1950s and the late 1970s, which he calls “the legalization of reform.” 
TELES, supra note 77, at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 78.  As I read it, this set of connections is only hinted at, not developed, in Teles’s account, which 
contains a great deal of valuable institutional detail. I am building on his reconstruction of the view of 
the legal profession that legal liberalism took to connect it with a larger idea of the legitimate forms of 
state power, dissent, and reform that it seems to me to echo. This formulation owes to Katrina 
Forrester’s manuscript-in-process on the history of post-World War II political and legal philosophy and 
the interaction with the salient events and dramas of the period (unpublished, partial manuscript on file 
with author). 
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reinforced embedded inequality.79 But legal liberalism was by no means 
determined by economic optimism alone. Rather, it formed a key part of what 
is often termed the “consensus liberalism” of the Cold War period in U.S. 
history.80 Procedural guarantees promised to bring neglected interests into 
decision making within a pluralist democracy that discarded ambitious visions 
of collective self-rule and also recast class conflict as interest-group politics.81 
In light of its picture of politics as the rotation of groups in and out of transient 
majorities, pluralist-democratic thought adopted a version of the concern with 
overcoming exclusion that also preoccupied the thinking of the time on 
economic policy. John Hart Ely’s conception of constitutional review as filling 
persistent structural gaps in political decision makers’ consideration of the 
interests of disadvantaged or disorganized groups represents the elevation of 
legal liberalism to constitutional theory, explicitly portraying judges’ remit as 
the procedural defense of those disadvantaged by an otherwise legitimate 
democratic pluralism.82 
The institutional trajectory of “mainstream environmentalism” in the early 
and mid-1970s took much of its shape from the legal-liberal conception of 
advocacy. These years shaped environmental politics for decades thereafter in 
the litigation and elite advocacy that the environmental justice movement 
critiqued. The key events in this history of influence were pivotal institutional 
investments in nascent environmental groups by the Ford Foundation, which 
had already been at the center of building up clinical programs in law schools 
and developing pro bono expectations for the bar, two key sites of 
implementation for the legal-liberal ideal of representation as advocacy.83 In 
the early and mid-1970s, the Ford Foundation made major grants to EDF and 
 
 79.  Teles does not make this argument, but David Grewal and I have, drawing on his version of 
“legal liberalism,” in Inequality Rediscovered. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 21. 
 80.  See, e.g., LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 3–14 (1955) (arguing that because America 
had never dealt with feudalism or needed to dismantle an old order, American political development has 
occurred within the context of an enduring, underlying Lockean liberal consensus). Although Hartz is 
often invoked as a consensus-school thinker, he is somewhat peculiar in that he took consensus as 
historical fact and sought to understand it, not uncritically. This puts him in a rather different light from, 
say, Daniel Boorstin, whose work is more emblematic of the political cast of the consensus school. See 
generally DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1953) (arguing that shared 
commitments to individual liberty and economic freedom—not any more systematic political 
philosophy—gave American politics its unique genius). 
 81.  It was not quite as neat as this; Teles, for instance, observes signs of anxiety about riots and 
social discontent in the motives of legal elites promoting legal liberalism. TELES, supra note 77, at 58‒
63. 
 82.  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST 105‒34 (1980) (setting out a theory of 
constitutional review as working procedurally to “[c]lear[] the [c]hannels of [p]olitical [c]hange” in 
democracy).  
 83.  See TELES, supra note 77, at 30‒52. As Teles details, the Ford Foundation made very 
substantial early grants in indigent defense and poverty law more generally, coming in advance of and 
helping to lay the ideological and institutional ground for publicly funded institutions that followed. 
Ford also played a key role in supporting the development of clinical education in law schools. 
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NRDC. Ford guidance helped to build up EDF from a grassroots coalition of 
scientists, lawyers, and citizens on Long Island.84 It also effectively founded 
NRDC by brokering the merger of a band of young, liberal, well-connected 
Yale Law School graduates with a Republican director of old-line 
conservationist impulses, the Simpson Thacher lawyer, John Adams.85 Ford 
made some of its largest cumulative Resources and Environment grants of the 
1970s to these groups: $3,635,000 to NRDC, $1,079,500 to EDF, $1,509,000 to 
the Southern California Center for Law in the Public Interest, and $760,000 to 
the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, which later became Earthjustice.86 Ford’s 
account of the reasons for these investments exemplifies the legal-liberal 
conception of advocacy: “The Foundation has been assisting the environmental 
law movement since 1970 in the belief that in a pluralistic society the views 
and interests of all segments of opinion should have their day in court.”87 The 
ideal was to bring all “views and interests” before an impartial decision maker, 
not to engage in political contests to form views and challenge or reshape 
interests. 
The deliberately bipartisan NRDC answered, like EDF, to a litigation 
review board carefully stocked with law-firm partners and sympathetic figures 
from the business world.88 Although this has been interpreted as evidence of 
elite control of these organizations, that view hardly comports with the 
controversial and radical cases that the young lawyers brought, particularly in 
their first decade.89 It is more convincing to see NRDC and EDF as instances 
of a general pattern in the institutions of legal liberalism: collaboration between 
senior professionals whose politics were often cast in a New Deal/Great 
Society mold and young activists, frequently with moderate New Left 
 
 84.  See ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 189‒93 (rev. ed. 2005) (recounting the story of EDF’s founding). 
 85.  See id. at 193‒95 (recounting the story of NRDC’s founding). 
 86.  FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1972); FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 19, 21 (1973); 
FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 32, 34 (1974); FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 14, 16 (1975); FORD 
FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1976); FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 20 (1977); FORD FOUND., 
ANNUAL REPORT 12–13 (1978); FORD FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 44 (1979). Ford also made a 
cumulative grant of $15.5 million from 1975 to 1978 to Resources for the Future, a research-oriented 
organization that remains a key resource for informed policy making. See FORD FOUND., ANNUAL 
REPORT 12 (1978). Also in the 1970s, Ford developed a proposal to fund Environmental Action, the 
advocacy and organizing group proposed by the creators of the original 1970 Earth Day, but abandoned 
it in late stages. GOTTLIEB, supra note 84, at 186‒88. The pattern of Ford’s field-shaping investments 
was decisively in favor of expert knowledge and advocacy, not grassroots political organizing. 
 87.  FORD FOUNDATION GRANTS IN RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 14 (emphasis added) 
(1978). 
 88.  See GOTTLIEB, supra note 85, at 202‒05 (discussing structure of Ford-funded environmental 
groups). 
 89.  For instance, NRDC forced EPA to develop water-quality criteria and effluent standards for 
sixty-five toxic chemicals and families of chemicals. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Train, 8 Env’t Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 2120, 2122 (D.D.C. June 9, 1976) (“Flannery decree”). EDF pressed EPA toward a more 
stringent policy on vinyl chloride emissions. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1149 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (recounting history of vinyl chloride litigation in a subsequent action filed upon EPA’s 
withdrawal of the rule that had resulted from earlier EDF litigation).  
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sympathies, who saw in the law an institutional path to very basic changes, 
including welfare rights, death-penalty and criminal-justice reform, and 
revolutions in sex and gender.90 Legal liberalism did not necessarily narrow or 
moderate the substantive scope of environmental politics. It did, however, 
imply a persistent tilt toward professionalized and elite advocacy that was less 
likely to engage ordinary people as active constituents than as donors or clients. 
The legal-liberal model of reform also meant that legally oriented activism 
followed the ideological peregrinations of the federal courts, not because the 
advocates became personally more moderate in their goals (whether or not they 
in fact did so), but because their strategy entailed that what was possible was a 
function of the arguments that judges would embrace. An advocate who started 
out with visions of enforcing a progressive conception of the public interest 
through public-trust or substantive National Environmental Policy Act suits in a 
green 1970s soon modified her expectations, much as reproductive-rights and 
poverty lawyers did as the Burger Court and its successors took hold of legal 
interpretation.91 
The shaping influence of legal liberalism on environmental law also tilted 
the definition of environmental problems toward professionals and established 
groups. The Ford Foundation expressed confidence that its grantees’ carefully 
calibrated litigation, in which clients were often well-established groups, 
ensured responsiveness to what the foundation seems to have regarded as an 
uncontroversial “public interest.” A 1976 internal report on the foundation’s 
involvement in public-interest law posed the question, “Are there substantial 
interests in the community that do not get represented adequately because of 
the way in which public interest law firms tend to choose their clientele?” and 
responded, “[M]ost of the time public interest law firms represent established 
and well-informed groups or organizations. The environmental . . . cases are the 
best examples of this.”92 This answer seems to have satisfied the report’s 
authors that their model of advocacy was adequately representing relevant 
environmental interests. Those who did not identify with well-established 
advocacy organizations might not have agreed. 
The architects of “mainstream environmentalism’s” flagship organizations 
knew, or so they believed, which problems were “environmental issues” and 
what interest the public had in those issues. This self-confidence was partly 
owing to a view about the empirical character of the natural world. The 
 
 90.  See TELES, supra note 77, at 46‒57. 
 91.  See generally CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN TWENTY-
FIRST-CENTURY AMERICA (2017) (discussing the development and current state of abortion law in the 
United States). 
 92.  Sanford M. Jaffe, Public Interest Law—Five Years Later, 62 AM. B. ASS’N J. 982, 985 
(1976). In 1962, the Ford Foundation focused on technocratic, democratic, and conservationist 
programs, and oriented to the problems that would be the crucible of mainstream environmentalism. 
From 1970 to 1975, the foundation took the new skepticism, radicalism, and resistance into the body of 
these ideas, and saw public-interest law as tending to become governance. By 1978, there was somewhat 
more awareness of deep pluralism. 
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influential “climax” theory of ecology described ecosystems as tending toward 
stable equilibriums with high levels of biological energy and diversity.93 This 
in turn seemed to imply natural baselines of health and flourishing—the climax 
condition—that policy makers could aim to respect.94 This self-confidence also 
expressed the unchallenged dominance of a network of elite reformers who 
shared a substantially overlapping set of ideas about “the environment” and the 
public interest in it. Homogeneity among decision makers allowed their view of 
the scope and valence of “environmental issues” to feel, so to speak, natural. 
This invisible uniformity was a key support for the melding of traditional 
environmentalism with legal liberalism, an institutional strategy that then 
proceeded to reinforce the same uniformity. 
D.  Summary 
The “mainstream environmentalism” that emerged in the 1970s was 
shaped by the premises of the time. The anti-pollution statutes were, as the 
environmental justice critique later emphasized, designed without attention to 
the prospect of their benefits and regulated harms being channeled along lines 
of economic inequality and persistent racial disadvantage. With economic 
inequality seemingly in decline, explicit distributive concerns seemed 
dispensable in writing environmental statutes. With other egalitarian policies in 
place and expected to grow, and disparate-impact protection as a backstop, it 
was easy for drafters to imagine that environmental statutes did not need to 
incorporate protections against compounding inequality. Legal liberalism 
helped to channel the enforcement of these statutes into elite and 
professionalized institutions that gave less voice to alternative views of 
environmental problems than they might otherwise have done. The historical 
irony is that it was precisely at the watershed moment of environmental 
legislation, 1970–77, that the anomalous period of widely shared growth was 
coming to an end, succeeded by four decades of increasingly unequal 
distribution of wealth and income, even as egalitarian political and doctrinal 
trends receded. The consequences were severe for populations that entered the 
1970s burdened by long histories of economic exclusion, and who now found 
that formal inclusion did not bring the convergence of economic outcomes that 
recent decades had encouraged optimistic forecasters to expect. 
III.  THE NEGLECTED LONG HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
In this Part, I excavate neglected historical strands of environmental 
politics that are marked by the following: attention to economic distribution 
 
 93.  See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 
8 (1996). 
 94.  See id. at 3–24 (discussing stability-oriented conceptions of the natural world, their influence 
and decline, and what succeeded them). 
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and power; an embrace of a broad definition of “environment” that includes 
neighborhoods and workplaces; and, in some cases, a commitment to public 
participation and mobilization. The environmentalism of the 1960s and 1970s 
was moving away from this dimension of its history and toward a narrower 
conceptualization of the human stakes in the natural world. Recovering these 
earlier strands contributes to the recognition and potential recovery of the long 
environmental justice movement. 
A.  Environment and Political Economy in the Early Wilderness Movement 
“Environment,” wrote Benton MacKaye in 1928, “is the influence upon 
each inner mind of the thing shared by every inner mind . . . the filament which 
binds our separate lives . . . the total life which every life must share.”95 What 
MacKaye meant by “environment” was the braided product of human and 
nonhuman systems. His paradigm of an environmental way of thinking was a 
description of New York City as a nexus of many kinds of “flows”: the Hudson 
River, the Atlantic tides, the weather-bearing wind out of the West, steel from 
the Great Lakes, commodities from Europe and South America, and people 
pulsing daily through the veins and arteries of the highways, subway, and 
commuter rail.96 As humanity came to understand and appreciate that the 
human environment was a skein of many systems, it faced what MacKaye 
called “the wilderness of civilization.”97 He meant by “wilderness” something 
newly encountered and not yet fully understood, something alien—despite 
being a human creation—and full of potential for both knowledge and wonder. 
In contemporaneous work, MacKaye contributed to making “wilderness” 
a key word in the mainstream environmental lexicon of the mid- and later 
twentieth century, and a key feature of the environmental agenda. MacKaye 
was a founder in 1935 of the Wilderness Society, which very substantially 
shaped the Wilderness Act of 1964, a statute that to date has preserved about 
110 million acres of federal land from development, mechanical transportation, 
and commercial activity.98 He is also commonly credited with the creation of 
the Appalachian Trail, which he substantially designed and long championed. 
At the risk of getting ahead of the story, MacKaye sits at the center of a 
standard and somewhat skeptical view of the mainstream environmental 
movement, one that environmental historian William Cronon famously set out 
in his 1996 essay “The Trouble with Wilderness.”99 Cronon argued that 
 
 95.  BENTON MACKAYE, THE NEW EXPLORATION: A PHILOSOPHY OF REGIONAL PLANNING 134 
(1928). It was, he continued, “the least common denominator of our inner selves.” Id.  
 96.  Id. at 5‒25. 
 97.  Id. at 15. 
 98.  Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131‒1136 
(2012)); Wilderness Act, WILDERNESS SOC’Y, http://wilderness.org/article/wilderness-act (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2017). 
 99.  William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature, ENVTL. 
HIST., Jan. 1996, at 7.  
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modern environmentalism is the product of a fixation on the wild and pristine 
that a relatively limited set of Romantic elites bequeathed to environmental 
politics.100 The problem with this version of environmentalism, Cronon argued, 
was that it overlooked and implicitly denigrated all the “fallen” places where 
people actually live, take most of their pleasure, and do most of their harm—
the places where we live, play, work, and learn, as the environmental justice 
movement put it.101 Cronon’s essay, which has become canonical in 
environmental-studies circles, picks out strands in the history of environmental 
ideas and politics, much before 1970, that anticipate and seem to help produce 
the elite and culturally narrow version of mainstream environmentalism that the 
environmental justice movement was critiquing as he wrote. 
The real history of the wilderness movement undercuts the implication 
that deep strands in environmental culture led ineluctably to its exclusion of 
cities, power, inequality, and the other focal points of environmental justice. 
MacKaye was a firm opponent of the binary between natural and artificial, and 
also opposed pastoral idylls and anti-urban politics. Contrasting his view with 
the anti-urban aesthetics and politics of Sierra Club founder John Muir, 
MacKaye professed a defining interest in the quality of experience possible in 
any setting: the opportunity to understand, admire, be moved by, and be at 
home in a place.102 These criteria were, in his mind, equally applicable to 
cities, regions, workplaces, and public recreational lands. The Appalachian 
Trail, as he envisioned and argued for it, would be not a walk in the woods, but 
a link among rural settlements of artists, artisans, and farmers, which would in 
turn be linked by roads to larger towns and cities.103 The wild portions of the 
trail, like designated wilderness areas on other public lands, would be dedicated 
to a certain kind of aesthetic experience—the solitary encounter with 
“untrammeled” nature.104 But the larger vision in which these wild places 
played a central role was not a binary image of wild versus tame or human 
versus natural, but a picture of a graduated series of engineered environments, 
summing to a harmonious pattern. 
 
 100.  Id. at 9–10.  
 101.  Id. at 20.  
 102.  See MACKAYE, supra note 95, at 215‒18. 
 103.  See Benton MacKaye, An Appalachian Trail: A Project in Regional Planning, 9 J. AM. INST. 
ARCHITECTS 325, 325‒330 (1921) (calling for the construction of the Appalachian Trail as a response to 
the problems of how people were being affected by war, a full-throttle industrial society, and the 
problem of society in which there was not enough work for everybody and yet use of leisure time was 
unsatisfying). Although it is not the topic of this Article, pervasive involvement in the racist and nativist 
strands of U.S. politics shaped many strands of the conservation movement in ways much less consonant 
with modern environmental justice themes than the elements that I am exploring here. See DORCETA E. 
TAYLOR, THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT: POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2016) (highlighting the role of racism in conservation and the exclusion 
of the voices of people of color from many of its early formulations); PURDY, AFTER NATURE, supra 
note 3, at 153–61, 182–87 (discussing these issues). 
 104.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (defining wilderness as an area “untrammeled by man”). 
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A New Dealer and a leader in the regional planning movement, MacKaye 
regarded workers’ struggles as part of the larger campaign for a better human 
environment. Writing of the mills near Pittsburgh, he reflected, “The workers 
dwelling in these steel towns are, as is well known, in profound rebellion 
against their condition in life.”105 Although all observers understood that 
strikers “are fighting deliberately and definitely for higher pay and for longer 
hours of leisure,” MacKaye argued that the strikes should also be seen as 
aiming at “better living conditions,” not just “time,” but “space” in which to 
develop and explore their own capacities.106 MacKaye’s environmental agenda 
focused on reshaping space to enrich human life for members of all classes. 
Robert Marshall was MacKaye’s Wilderness Society co-founder and the 
president of the organization before he died suddenly at the age of thirty-eight. 
Marshall was head of the Washington, D.C. branch of the American Civil 
Liberties Union; Chief of Forestry for the Bureau of Indian Affairs under John 
Collier, who implemented the partial restoration of tribal ownership and self-
government that is often termed the “Indian New Deal”; and, on his own 
account, a socialist who looked forward to the replacement of “the profit 
system” by administration and cooperation.107 He was an unrelenting advocate 
for the aesthetic and cultural value of wilderness.108 But for him, as for 
MacKaye, wilderness was only an element in a much broader program for the 
public reshaping of the American landscape. He argued for nationalizing most 
of the country’s commercial timber land (mainly by purchase and tax default), 
both to impose what he regarded as rational management on a boom-and-bust 
sector and to break what he called the “whip hand” of the timber industry over 
both workers and regulators.109 He envisioned public forestry management as 
part of a larger program of “rural reorganization” in which the federal 
government would facilitate the movement of farmers and other rural residents 
from regions that had been ecologically and economically damaged by 
mismanagement of natural resources to more viable settlements “concentrated 
 
 105.  MACKAYE, supra note 95, at 143. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See JAMES M. GLOVER, A WILDERNESS ORIGINAL: THE LIFE OF BOB MARSHALL 149 (1986) 
(quoting letters that Marshall wrote in the winter of 1932‒33, saying, “the only eventual solution will be 
Socialism” and “I wish very sincerely that Socialism could be put into effect right away and the profit 
system eliminated”). See, for example, id. at 185, for Marshall’s leadership in the ACLU, and id. at 157‒
66 for Marshall’s service under Collier. 
 108.  See, e.g., Robert Marshall, The Problem of the Wilderness, 30 SCI. MONTHLY 141, 143–45 
(1930) (arguing, rather eccentrically but with great intensity, that the pleasure wilderness devotees took 
in the unspoiled outdoors was so qualitatively distinct from other satisfactions that it swamped the 
utilitarian calculus that was otherwise appropriate in management decisions for public lands). 
 109.  See ROBERT MARSHALL, THE PEOPLE’S FORESTS 89‒97 (1933) (attacking private ownership 
and management of commercial forests); id. at 123‒40 (advocating public ownership for both 
conservation and worker-welfare reasons); id. at 141‒58 (advocating public acquisition of forests by 
transfer, as “the fact is inescapable that with the country functioning on a capitalistic basis it is out of the 
question to consider confiscation as a feasible means of acquiring public forests”).  
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in those areas best adapted for agriculture instead of [rural people] being 
scattered all over the outdoors.”110 
Both Marshall’s statist program for forest management and rural 
reorganization and MacKaye’s agenda for comprehensive regional landscape 
planning make clear that the wilderness movement was conceived as part of a 
much larger reconstruction of American landscapes, residential patterns, 
resource use, and the boundaries between state and market. That reconstructive 
program did not, to be sure, present an environmental justice program adequate 
to all of the concerns that actuated the later environmental justice movement. 
Most significantly, like much Progressive and New Deal thinking and practice, 
it reflected reformers’ capitulation, or commitment, to white supremacy. 
Although the figures under discussion here did not share the eugenicist views 
of Forest Service leader and conservation theorist Gifford Pinchot or the 
obsessive racism of the influential preservationist Madison Grant, they did not 
engage or reflect on the African American freedom struggle.111 Wilderness 
Society figures tended, moreover, to favor expert administration over popular 
participation, anticipating the professional and expert advocacy of later 
environmentalism.112 Advocates such as MacKaye and Marshall were, 
nonetheless, keenly interested in the broad shape of American political 
economy, the distributive contests over economic and political power that they 
saw in the fields of both politics and labor, and the qualitative shape that law 
making gave to the places where people live, work, play, and learn. They were, 
in those respects, members of a long environmental justice movement. 
B.  The Industrial Hygiene Roots of Pollution Politics 
The publication in 1942 of Wilhelm Hueper’s Occupational Tumors and 
Allied Diseases presented “the first major survey of the international literature 
on occupational causes of cancer and a hard-hitting assessment of the 
proliferation of hazards associated with new synthetic chemicals in the 
workplace.”113 Hueper’s work consolidated a professional, lab-based version of 
the “industrial hygiene” movements of previous decades.114 When Hueper 
argued that “the new artificial environment” of industrial chemicals created a 
new front in the imperative for government to secure “[t]he fundamental 
requirements for a healthful living, not merely for a small, select, and socially 
privileged group, but for the entirety of its citizens . . . by suitable laws 
adequately enforced,” he was working in a decades-long tradition of reformist 
 
 110.  Id. at 165‒70. Marshall wrote in the same vein, “Many entire towns and even counties should 
be abandoned to the forests.” Id. at 166. 
 111.  See PURDY, supra note 3, at 180–227 (discussing eugenicist and racist strains in proto-
environmental politics and the attitudes and effects of the wilderness movement). 
 112.  See id. 
 113.  William C. Boyd, Genealogies of Risk: Searching for Safety, 1930s‒1970s, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
895, 923 (2012).  
 114.  See id.  
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public-health research, but also confirming its turn from fieldwork to lab work, 
from narrative to risk measurement.115 The previous generation of this work 
had been defined by the pioneering industrial-health researcher (and the first 
woman on the Harvard faculty) Alice Hamilton, who studied the health of 
factory workers intensively between 1908 (her appointment to the Illinois 
Commission on Occupational Diseases) and 1935 (her retirement from 
Harvard), including major investigations of the health effects of lead and 
phosphorous.116 Hamilton had previously studied the epidemiology of typhoid 
in neighborhoods surrounding Chicago’s Progressive enclave, Hull House, 
where she was a resident, and her industrial work was an application of that 
style of fieldwork to the factory. 
A sympathetic observer of the Lawrence, Massachusetts textile strike of 
1931–32, Hamilton regarded the political power of manufacturers as a key 
impediment to reforming industrial conditions, and unions as playing an 
essential role in bringing about better conditions.117 In her support for 
organized labor as a necessary part of the governance of industrial conditions, 
Hamilton reflected not just the pitched conflicts over union organizing in the 
early decades of the twentieth century, but the more specific engagement of 
unions in workplace health. Between 1921 and 1928, the Workers’ Health 
Bureau of America, which began as a project of the labor and public-health 
reformers Grace Burnham and Harriet Silverman, established a beachhead as a 
labor-based institution for research and advocacy on industrial health.118 With 
an independent relationship with union locals, the Bureau by 1927 received 
dues from 190 member locals in 24 states and collaborated with leading public-
health researchers.119 Burnham insisted on setting research agendas “from the 
 
 115.  Id. at 924 (quoting WILHELM C. HUEPER, OCCUPATIONAL TUMORS AND ALLIED DISEASES 3‒
5, 848 (1942)). 
 116.  See ALICE HAMILTON, EXPLORING THE DANGEROUS TRADES: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF 
ALICE HAMILTON, M.D. 114–26 (OEM Press Edition 1995) (1943) (recounting work on phosphorous 
and lead exposure); id. at 138–60 (detailing research into lead, silica, and solvent exposure). 
 117.  See id. at 357–58 (noting the “industrial feudalism” of the Lawrence mills, in which low 
wages combined with denial of “self-respect and a sense of human dignity” to inspire conflict); id. at 12 
(“[T]he National Association of Manufacturers has fought the passage of occupational-disease 
compensation as it has fought laws against child labor, laws establishing a minimum wage for women 
and a maximum working day.”); id. at 6, 13 (contrasting the “hot, dirty, and dangerous work . . . [and] 
contempt from more fortunate Americans” that plagued the unorganized workers whom she observed at 
the beginning of her career with structured negotiation among trade unions, industry representatives, and 
experts in England). Boyd claims that Hamilton saw responsibility for factory conditions as residing 
mostly with supervisors, and argues that this represents a pre-New Deal view of the limits of the 
regulatory state. See Boyd, supra note 113, at 924 n.112. This claim strikes me as exaggerating the 
contrast between Hamilton and later reformers, although it is true that in (one version of) classic 
Progressive style, she had many warm words for individual managers who took responsibility for 
factory conditions. 
 118.  See David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz, Safety and Health as a Class Issue: The Workers’ 
Health Bureau of America during the 1920s, in DYING FOR WORK: WORKERS’ SAFETY AND HEALTH IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 53, 53–64 (David Rosner & Gerald Markowitz eds., 1989). 
 119.  See id. at 60.  
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standpoint of the worker,” the “individual . . . caught and bound fast in the 
great web of machine industry as the fly is caught in the thousand-strand web 
of the spider.”120 The roots of industrial toxicology were thus thoroughly 
enmeshed with movements for reform and efforts to build both workers’ power 
and systems of industrial governance in the early part of the twentieth century. 
Their concern was the democratic and humanitarian management of the 
“artificial environment” that the industrial economy produced. 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, an eloquent brief against reckless pesticide 
use, builds on Hueper’s work in its treatment of contaminated drinking water, 
DDT, cancer in wild fish, and the imperative of eliminating carcinogenic agents 
from the environment as a public-health prophylactic, among other topics.121 
Carson, however, put the tradition of industrial toxicology to a new use. Like 
the larger environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s, to which she 
importantly contributed, Carson expanded the scope of environmental 
questions by thematizing the human relationship to the natural world as a 
whole, rather than specific places and resources. She narrowed environmental 
discourse by treating the social world as populated by an undifferentiated 
humanity, whose emblematic middle-class members lived almost exclusively in 
small towns and suburbs. The rhetorical switch uprooted the tradition of 
industrial toxicology from its constitutive engagement in social and economic 
reform. 
C.  The Great Forgetting: The Narrowing Agenda of the 1950s and 1960s 
As we have seen, the political program of wilderness preservation began 
as part of a New Deal vision of public ownership, planning for quality of life, 
and, above all, an integration among different kinds of human environments, 
with wilderness as just one type of managed environment, prized for offering 
solitude and sustained encounters with the nonhuman world. This solitude was 
figured as one note in a larger legal composition of sociability, and as a 
political goal connected with workers’ struggles for more livable workplaces 
and communities. 
By the middle of the 1950s, the vision had narrowed. The Wilderness 
Society formed a strategic alliance with the Sierra Club, whose longtime head, 
David Brower, had recently won an attention-getting battle to stop a dam that 
would have flooded Dinosaur Monument on the Utah-Colorado line, and was 
looking for a new flagship issue. Exploring whether wilderness might fill the 
role, he offered a back-page essay in the influential Sierra Bulletin to Howard 
Zahniser, the Wilderness Society’s longtime secretary and the editor of its 
journal, Living Wilderness. In that essay, Zahniser argued that time spent in the 
 
 120.  Id. at 54‒55 (quoting GRACE M. BURNHAM, A HEALTH PROGRAM FOR ORGANIZED LABOR 
(1921)).  
 121.  See RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 18, 50, 221–25, 235, 239, 240–43 (First Mariner Books 
2002) (1962). 
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wilderness could induce a special kind of ecological and ethical insight, arising 
from “areas of the earth within which we stand without our mechanisms that 
make us immediate masters over our environment—areas of wild nature in 
which we sense ourselves to be, what in fact I believe we are, dependent 
members of an interdependent community of living creatures that together 
derive their existence from the sun.”122 For the rest of its successful eight-year 
push for passage of the Wilderness Act (which became law in 1964), the 
Wilderness Society, its congressional supporters, and its movement allies 
would focus on this line of argument: that wilderness offered unique spiritual 
insight and renewal, thus serving as a natural cathedral for the weekend 
pilgrim. In a speech that the Wilderness Act’s Senate sponsor, Hubert 
Humphrey, entered into the Congressional Record in 1961 as an account of the 
philosophy of the legislation, Zahniser again argued that, in wilderness, 
Americans were “keeping ourselves in touch with true reality” and “our 
primeval origin, our natural home” while also finding “relief from the stress 
and strain of our civilized living.”123 This was precisely the line of argument 
that the Sierra Club had long used in advocating for preservation of scenic and 
recreational land: a combination of aesthetic uplift, ethical instruction, and 
middle-class vacation.124 
Brower was at this time building the Sierra Club’s political strategy 
around the marketing of scenic lands in the form of sumptuous and expensive 
coffee-table books, one of which, This Is Dinosaur, had been the central 
document in the Club’s successful defense of Dinosaur Monument.125 The 
Sierra Club had long been apolitical outside of its advocacy for preserving 
public lands; the Sierra Club Bulletin managed to avoid discussion of World 
War I other than an occasional note from a soldier recalling a favorite hike at 
home, and Muir avoided the Civil War and said nothing about the racial, labor, 
or other conflicts of a long life lived in interesting times.126 The Wilderness 
Society, in its alliance with the Sierra Club, perfected its own version of single-
issue advocacy, in which wilderness was the singular goal, its values readily 
translatable to a professional’s vacation schedule. 
 
 122.  Howard Zahniser, “What’s Behind the Wilderness Idea?”, SIERRA CLUB BULLETIN, Jan. 
1956, at 32, 32.  
 123.  107 CONG. REC. 18,356 (1961). 
 124.  For instance, John Muir, the charismatic devotee of the outdoors who founded the Sierra Club 
in 1892 and was its public face until his death in 1914, had promised his readers that, thanks to the Great 
Northern Railroad’s lines from San Francisco to the Sierras, they could step off a train platform and “in 
a few minutes [they would] find [them]self in the midst of . . . the best care-killing scenery on the 
continent.” JOHN MUIR, OUR NATIONAL PARKS 17 (1901). 
 125.  See generally JOHN MCPHEE, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCHDRUID (1971) (offering a wry 
portrait of Brower’s political strategy as a merchant of aesthetics). 
 126.  I once went through all Sierra Club Bulletin issues from the relatively short period of U.S. 
involvement in World War I, wondering whether Muir’s high-country Transcendentalism had preserved 
any of its New England antecedents’ skepticism of war and nationalism, and found no evidence that it 
had. See generally DONALD WORSTER, A PASSION FOR NATURE: THE LIFE OF JOHN MUIR (2008) 
(discussing Muir’s own apolitical attitudes). 
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Meanwhile, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring was published in 1962. 
Carson’s book, which gets well-deserved credit for formulating the sense of 
threat that informed so much of environmental politics in the ensuing fifteen 
years, followed on the public-minded studies of industrial toxins that Alice 
Hamilton and others had pioneered. And Carson, whose writing was a form of 
activism and who was pilloried by the chemical industry for her efforts, did 
note in her first chapter that she wrote in “an era dominated by industry, in 
which the right to make a dollar at whatever cost is seldom challenged.”127 On 
the whole, however, Carson crafted an environmental rhetoric that avoided the 
political and economic engagement of earlier generations and instead centered 
its attention on threats to small-town and suburban domesticity on the one hand 
and, on the other, threats to a natural world that Carson portrayed as a treasure-
trove of long-established harmonies among species and their settings. Carson 
opened Silent Spring with an image of “a town in the heart of America where 
all life seemed to live in harmony with its surroundings,” which was 
mysteriously visited by “a strange blight” and “a shadow of death.”128 She 
described an undisturbed world in which “life reached a state of adjustment and 
balance with its surroundings,” and contrasted it with the world after the 
application of pesticides, where “the whole closely knit fabric of life has been 
ripped apart.”129 
I offer these two developments, in the wilderness movement and the 
tradition of public-minded toxicology, as emblematic of a change in which 
environmental themes that earlier in the twentieth century seemed closely tied 
with working conditions, economic power, and the larger question of how to 
shape American life were adjusted to fit the constraints of mid-twentieth-
century consensus politics. Within those constraints, the basic questions about 
how Americans were to live seemed settled; they would live in suburbs, 
modeled on idyllic small towns, separated from their workplaces spatially but 
also by the distance between an ethics of commerce and an ethics of 
domesticity.130 Carson did not portray these spheres as involved in disputes 
either over the rules that should prevail within them or over their boundaries 
and relations with one another—the kinds of disputes that feminism, labor 
politics, and the civil rights movement had launched and would soon amplify. 
The only break in the harmony came, on this account, from failing to respect 
the perennial balance of nature. 
 
 127.  CARSON, supra note 121, at 13. 
 128.  Id. at 1–2.  
 129.  Id. at 6, 67.  
 130.  See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (2001) (treating critically the 
suburban family structure and form of life); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE 
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985) (describing the centrality of the suburb to American 
life in the twentieth century); CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY 
BESIEGED (1977) (analyzing the centrality of the middle-class family structure to post-World War II 
American life).  
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Carson, to repeat, was a courageous activist and, it bears mentioning, a 
feminist who faced misogynistic attacks from the industries that her writing 
threatened. No part of this argument is directed personally at her or, for that 
matter, at the strategists of the Wilderness Society. The point is rather that the 
successes for which we remember them are symptomatic of the scope of 
political economy and political imagination in their time. The logic of the 
ecological threat that they identified, which soon became a general formula in 
environmental mobilization and legislation, was simultaneously that everything 
must change, in the form of collective self-restraint to respect and restore 
natural harmonies; and that nothing in particular must change, that is, the 
environmental crisis was not linked to calls for other changes in the legal or 
social order. This environmentalism was a defense of society, imagined as a 
whole, against an exogenous ecological crisis. That formula led Time and 
President Nixon, among others, to identify the environment as a unifying issue 
for the 1970s, in explicit contrast to conflicts over race.131 
The availability of this environmentalist formula for national unification in 
the face of other divisive political and social conflicts was what, in turn, 
suggested to left-wing critics that it was a covert form of pastoral conservatism 
in radical costume.132 The same appeal to a certain blend of urgency and 
complacency, the complacency residing in a disinclination to ask which 
America was to be saved, and for whom, would later draw the attention of the 
environmental justice movement. But this complacency was a recent 
development in the mainstream environmentalism of the 1960s and very early 
1970s, not a perennial feature of environmental politics. Nor, as we shall see in 
the next Part, was it ever the whole story. 
IV.  WHICH MOVEMENT? WHOSE ENVIRONMENT? OPEN QUESTIONS, 1968–81 
Despite the narrowing just described, there were active strands of 
environmental politics in the late 1960s and early-to-mid-1970s that continued 
to represent a broad, justice-oriented political economy, which might have 
contributed to the institutionalization of a different version of 
environmentalism. Key examples here are two very different labor institutions, 
the insurgent Miners for Democracy (MFD) and the United Auto Workers 
(UAW), the established union that for decades represented “the left wing of the 
 
 131.  See, e.g., President Richard M. Nixon, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the 
Union (Jan. 22, 1970) (arguing that answering the environmental crisis could unite Americans otherwise 
divided by political “part[ies]” and “factions”); Issue of the Year: The Environment, TIME, Jan. 4, 1971, 
at 21 (noting that the environmental crisis is a “problem which American skills . . . might actually solve, 
unlike the immensely more elusive problems of race prejudice or the war in Viet Nam”). 
 132.  See, e.g., John H. Schaar & Sheldon S. Wolin, Where We Are Now, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 
(May 7, 1970), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1970/05/07/where-we-are-now/ (describing the 
environment as “the kind of issue which . . . permits a full catharsis of moral indignation without 
seriously altering the structure of power or the logic of the system”). 
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possible.”133 A combination of contingent events and structural trends took 
these movements off the table as defining allies for an environmental law 
community that was, in the same years, taking the institutional form that the 
environmental justice movement soon arose to criticize. 
A.  Miners for Democracy: An Appalachian Labor Environmentalism? 
MFD was at once a throwback to the self-organized and confrontational 
labor mobilization of the pre-National Labor Relations Act era and a social 
movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In its most effective period, MFD 
toppled the longstanding leadership of the United Mineworkers of America 
(UMWA) and brought rank-and-file miners into active union governance in a 
way that the coalfields, and indeed most of American labor, had not seen for 
decades.134 Inspired in part by the 1969 murder of Joseph “Jock” Yablonski, an 
anti-establishment candidate for the presidency of the UMWA, the MFD is best 
remembered as an anti-corruption movement for clean union elections and 
accountable leadership.135 It is also widely recognized that the MFD drew 
power from a surge of coalfield discontent around workplace safety and health. 
On November 20, 1968, an explosion of methane and coal dust in the Consol 
No. 9 mine in Farmington, West Virginia killed seventy-eight miners, and the 
response of the UMWA’s leadership was widely perceived as tepid and 
accommodating toward the coal companies.136 In the next year, miners 
mobilized as never before around another workplace safety issue: 
pneumoconiosis, or “black lung,” the destruction of lung tissue by exposure to 
fine coal dust.137 This endemic and often deadly industrial disease had grown 
more widespread as mechanized mining increased exposure to fine dust in the 
mines, and miners and their families grew increasingly aware of the etiology of 
the deadly disorder.138 More than 40,000 miners walked off the job in strikes in 
 
 133.  The phrase comes from the socialist writer Michael Harrington. See Maurice Isserman, 
Michael Harrington (1928–1989): Socialist Intellectual, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. LABOR AND 
WORKING-CLASS HISTORY: VOLUME 2, at 569 (Eric Arnesen ed., 2007).   
 134.  See JEFFERSON COWIE, STAYIN’ ALIVE: THE 1970S AND THE LAST DAYS OF THE WORKING 
CLASS 23–38 (2010) (detailing the rise and fall of the MFD). Interestingly, Cowie, who shares some 
version of my interest in identifying the unrealized potential of insurgent movements such as the MFD, 
seems to be entirely unaware of the environmental connection, and identifies environmentalism with the 
well-educated, high-minded Morris Udall wing of U.S. politics. See id. at 263. A somewhat reflexive 
identification of environmentalism with elite aesthetic and cultural fixations seems, indeed, somewhat 
typical of those who identify with the defeated left of radical labor and/or the radical civil-rights 
movement. See, e.g., Alex Gourevitch, Two Hurricanes, JACOBIN (Aug. 9, 2012), https://jacobin 
mag.com/2012/10/two-hurricanes-2/; Alex Gourevitch, Environmentalism—Long Live the Politics of 
Fear, 22 PUB. CULTURE 411, 420–24 (2010); Alex Gourevitch et al., Forum: War on Global 
Warming/War on Terror, N+1 (Winter 2008), https://nplusonemag.com/issue-6/politics/forum-war-on-
global-warming-war-on-terror/.   
 135.  See COWIE, supra note 134, at 33–38. 
 136.  See id. at 30–31.  
 137.  See id. at 31–32. 
 138.  See id. at 31. Cowie refers to company doctors who attributed to heart failure deaths caused 
by the lungs’ inability to transmit oxygen to the blood, as well as oral traditions of miners being 
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West Virginia in 1969, in coordination with the Black Lung Association, a 
grassroots advocacy group of miners, their families, and doctors.139 The 
strikers demanded a comprehensive, adequately funded system of health 
benefits for mining retirees, especially victims of black lung. At one point, 95 
percent of the state’s miners walked off the job for 23 days, substantially 
shutting down the region’s coal industry.140 
What is less well recognized is that the MFD’s commitment to workplace 
safety was part of a larger conception of environmental health and justice. 
Yablonksi’s campaign for the UMWA presidency included opposition to strip 
mining, the predecessor to today’s mountaintop removal, already recognized as 
an environmental burden concentrated in poor parts of Appalachia. Yablonski’s 
successor, Arnold Miller, continued the opposition to strip mining in his 
successful 1972 campaign as MFD’s candidate for the presidency of the 
UMWA.141 Environmental ideas had been disseminated through the UMWA 
Journal, originally in opportunistic opposition to atomic power, but in a way 
that seems to have been genuinely taken up in both the insurgents’ leadership 
and their rank and file. In 1972, a miner reflected about strip mining and the 
acid drainage associated with destructive mining techniques and inadequate 
reclamation: 
The people in the valleys are liable to get washed out one of these days 
with floods and slides. . . . Look at the creek in front of my house. You 
can’t even find a minnow in there, with all that silt, mud, and acid in the 
water. Even a mule couldn’t drink that water! After the big companies 
finish here, a man might as well pack up and leave! The water will be all 
dried up. The timber will be all cut off. . . . I think the people ought to have 
something to say about where our mountain resources go. We need better 
schools and better roads in Letcher County. We need parks. But the big 
money men own everything and ship it out.142 
Declaring his candidacy, Yablonski proposed to expand the frame of 
occupational health to one of community and landscape health: “What good is a 
union that reduces coal dust in the mines only to have miners and their families 
breathe pollutants in the air, drink pollutants in the water, and eat contaminated 
commodities?”143 Rachel Carson might have asked the same question; what is 
remarkable is to find it here. The appeal to environmentalism as an integral part 
 
officially reassured that coal dust was good for health. He quotes a miner from Harlan County, 
Kentucky, as recalling, “You was taught, and I believed it, that coal dust was good for you. I’d actually 
feel proud when I could cough up a mouthful of that black stuff and spit it out.” Id.  
 139.  See id. at 32. 
 140.  See id. (calling this action “the largest strike for an occupational health issue in American 
history”). 
 141.  See Paul J. Nyden, Miners for Democracy: Struggle in the Coal Fields 884 (1974) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with author). 
 142.  Id. at 751 (quoting Bernie Johnson, a thirty-seven-year-old miner from Letcher County). 
 143.  Trish Kahle, The Graveyard Shift: Mining Democracy in an Age of Energy Crisis, 1963‒73, 
at 34 (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author).  
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of miners’ struggles over workplace safety and political power was later 
elaborated in the MFD’s 1972 platform, whose two leading planks were mine 
safety and the coalfield environment.144 The MFD platform advocated a 
national ban on strip mining and proposed that both the anti-stripping position 
and the priority of miners’ workplace safety should be directly enforced 
through work stoppages.145 This was a double radicalism, both substantive and 
procedural. Substantively, it tied workplace safety to environmental 
responsibility; procedurally, it cast organized workers as the enforcers of 
industry-level principles that they had themselves formulated. If coal could not 
be mined safely and without lasting environmental damage, the miners argued, 
it should not be mined at all and they should refuse to mine it. West Virginia 
Representative Ken Hechler, a voice for vulnerable regions in the CAA debate, 
called the MFD’s platform “a veritable Magna Carta for the coal miners of 
America.”146 
B.  Allies: The Nader Movement and the United Auto Workers 
The MFD attracted the attention of progressive activists who hoped to 
build cross-class and interracial alliances. Angela Davis spoke out in support of 
the MFD during a speech at West Virginia University, and Ralph Nader argued 
that the miners’ broad effort to build a more democratic union was the only 
way to achieve more specific goals such as treating and preventing black 
lung.147 Defenders of the traditional UMWA leadership, in turn, pilloried the 
MFD for Nader’s support.148 Indeed, Nader’s “raiders,” young public-interest 
researchers who sought to lay the informational groundwork for community 
organizing and democratic reform, understood environmental questions much 
as the MFD did. In a series of “Nader Reports,” they analyzed environmental 
problems as the joint products of corporate power, workers’ economic 
dependence, and political inequality, which only a deepened democracy could 
adequately address. As the young James Fallows wrote in a 1971 Nader report 
on pulp and paper mills outside Savannah, Georgia, “water pollution and ‘the 
environmental crisis’ had become . . . bland and shopworn topics,” but the 
“raiders” wanted to go further and trace the entire complex of problems to 
“[t]he same economic and political arrangements that have ruined the river.”149 
The report was careful to note that the burden of mill pollution in the Savannah 
 
 144.  See id. at 39 (interpreting the MFD’s “Miners’ Bill of Rights,” as the platform was titled).  
 145.  See id. at 41.  
 146.  Id. at 34.  
 147.  See Nyden, supra note 141, at 577–78 (on Davis); Cowie, supra note 134, at 31 (quoting 
Nader). 
 148.  See Nyden, supra note 141, at 509–10.  
 149.  JAMES M. FALLOWS, THE WATER LORDS: RALPH NADER’S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON 
INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS IN SAVANNAH, GEORGIA xix (1971). 
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area fell heavily on the poorest neighborhoods.150 Three years later, a Nader 
report on the same industry’s air and water pollution in Maine went further in 
integrating environmental diagnosis with political economy, devoting chapters 
to industry concentration, political influence, and labor contracts.151 In fact, 
The Paper Plantation was not so much an environmental report as a synthetic 
account of the political economy of Maine, with the state’s ecological problems 
diagnosed as symptoms of a highly inequitable distribution of power. 
In the early 1970s there were also sources of institutional support for 
organizing along these lines. The UAW, under that union’s longtime leader 
Walter Reuther, contributed money and support to the first Earth Day in 1970, 
and in 1972 argued that, “The chief victims of pollution are the urban poor, 
Blacks and workers who cannot escape their environment. Unless we join 
together now to stop those who pollute for profit, our cities will become ugly 
cesspools of poisonous pollutants.”152 Reuther’s UAW was long associated 
with “the left wing of the possible” in post-World War II American politics. 
Although its 1950 “Treaty of Detroit” with the auto companies exemplified the 
mid-century American bargain by which unions guaranteed industrial peace 
and gave up say over enterprise management, in return for generous benefits 
and guaranteed wage increases, the UAW was also a leading American 
practitioner of “social unionism,” pressing for generous social provision, 
desegregation, and other progressive goals beyond its own workplaces.153 In 
1970, the year that he died in a plane crash, Reuther distributed an 
environmental questionnaire to union members to prepare the UAW’s 
executive board to consider making “the problem of pollution . . . a matter for 
collective bargaining in the 1970 negotiations” with General Motors.154 In one 
of his last official addresses, Reuther offered his own view of the question: 
“[T]he environmental crisis has reached such catastrophic proportions that . . . 
the labor movement is now obligated to raise this question at the bargaining 
table in any industry that is in a measurable way contributing to man’s 
deteriorating living environment.”155 This was less than two years before UAW 
workers revived disputes over enterprise management in a strike at the 
Chevrolet Vega plant in Lordstown, Ohio, where 97 percent of members voted 
 
 150.  Id. at 245 (“All five of Savannah’s housing projects are located in areas where air pollution is 
unusually high. As with so many other issues, the poor suffer most and . . . can do least about it.”); see 
also id. at 166‒70 (examining the extent of poverty in a larger region dominated by pulp-and-paper 
production). 
 151.  WILLIAM C. OSBORN, THE PAPER PLANTATION: RALPH NADER’S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON 
THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY IN MAINE 129–258 (1974). 
 152.  Andrew D. Van Alstyne, The United Auto Workers and the Emergence of Labor 
Environmentalism, 18 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 613, 622 (2015) (quoting UAW vice president and department 
head Olga Madar). 
 153.  See COWIE, supra note 134, at 43 (noting that, under Reuther, the UAW failed to practice at 
home what it urged in policy, tolerating effective segregation and racism in the factory). 
 154.  Van Alstyne, supra note 152, at 621. 
 155.  Id. at 620‒21.  
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to walk off the job to protest assembly speed and hyper-Taylorist task 
fragmentation. That is to say, the relatively left-leaning UAW and the insurgent 
MFD were both willing to revisit the terms of the “Treaty of Detroit” and put 
enterprise management and society-wide economic policy back on the 
bargaining table, precisely at the moment when a class-and-labor version of 
environmentalism seemed to be taking form.156 
This moment was so different from what followed that recovering a sense 
of its potential can be difficult. By 1974, the MFD was finished as a vital 
organization, having elected a charismatic UMWA head, Arnold Miller, whose 
presidency was soon undermined by opposition from old-line union operatives 
and, at least as much, his own emerging paranoia and isolation.157 In 1977, not 
quite seven years after Reuther’s death, the UAW opposed amendments to 
strengthen the CAA.158 However, the MFD’s insurgency, the Nader-led 
activists, and the UAW’s activity from the mid-1960s (when it began 
cooperating with the Sierra Club on water-quality issues) constitute evidence 
that versions of environmental politics existed in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
other than those institutionalized in the mainstream environmental groups with 
the guidance and assistance of the Ford Foundation. These and other 
movements and institutions suggest that there was potential for an 
environmentalism that would have been intensely concerned with the 
distribution of environmental burdens among communities and regions and 
with economic and political power. This alternative environmentalism would 
have taken working, nonwhite, and poor people as among its natural 
constituencies and concerned itself centrally with the conditions of labor and 
workplace hazards. Although some work along these lines has always been part 
of mainstream environmental advocacy, these themes were not central to the 
environmentalism that emerged from the struggles of the 1970s. 
C.  Institutional Agenda Consolidation in the Early 1980s 
In 1985, a coalition of ten influential environmental groups marked four 
years of close collaboration on priorities and strategy with the publication of An 
Environmental Agenda for the Future.159 This small book devoted many of its 
pages to woods-and-waters issues, characteristic 1980s worries about nuclear 
 
 156.  Trish Kahle argues that rank-and-file MFD members and certain union locals were engaged in 
arguments about the role that coal should play in the national energy economy. She argues that their 
change in self-identification from “coal” to “energy workers” both engaged the miners in a vision of 
energy policy as a relatively plastic field in which there were many potentially democratic choices to be 
made and presented an opportunity for them to think about the comparative environmental effects of 
competing modes of fuel extraction and energy production. See Kahle, supra note 143, at 10–12. 
 157.  See COWIE, supra note 134, at 35–38, 254–56. 
 158.  See Van Alstyne, supra note 152, at 623. 
 159.  ADAMS ET AL., supra note 16, at 1–23. Participants included Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Environmental Policy Institute, National Wildlife Federation, Environmental Defense Fund, 
The Izaak Walton League of America, Sierra Club, National Audubon Society, National Parks and 
Conservation Association, The Wilderness Society, and Friends of the Earth. Id. 
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waste disposal and nuclear conflict, and the effect of pollution on public health 
in general.160 It paid no real attention, however, to the distribution of 
environmental burdens along lines of race or class (except for a brief, favorable 
reference to fresh-air-fund camps for city youth), let alone to the systemic 
issues of economic structure and political power that had preoccupied the MFD 
and the Nader groups.161 An Environmental Agenda, then, represented the 
consolidation of the environmental movement into a particular version of itself: 
white, upper-middle class, and concerned with a set of issues that effectively 
integrated the post-1970 pollution laws (the special concern of NRDC and 
EDF) with the older agendas of public-lands preservation (The Wilderness 
Society, the National Parks and Conservation Association) and biodiversity 
maintenance—at least for those aspects of biodiversity with recreational and 
aesthetic benefits (National Audubon Society, the Izaak Walton League of 
America). Prominently omitted were the concerns with working conditions, 
economic power, political accountability, and neighborhood health that had 
been important to the more radical strands of environmental politics in the 
1960s and 1970s. Absent, too, were institutional bearers of those radical 
strands: labor, Naderite research-and-organizing groups, and the grassroots 
outfits that were already (or still) fighting toxic-waste, garbage disposal, and 
mining battles across the country. 
For example, surface mining continued after the MFD disputes, mostly 
outside the major environmental groups’ priorities.162 The Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, a legislative compromise between the 
coal industry and surface-mining abolitionists, required that mining sites be 
restored to their “approximate original contour[s].”163 The CWA’s restrictions 
on the discharge of pollutants into waterways also offered a potential limit on 
the practice of depositing mountaintop removal mining rubble, or 
“overburden,” into nearby valleys, burying headwater streams in as much as six 
hundred feet of broken rock.164 Nonetheless, state regulators issued permits 
 
 160.  See id. 
 161.  See id. It is also notable, that in a favorable discussion of birth-control policies, the report did 
not acknowledge the political ambivalence around this discourse that arises from the long history of 
coerced or semi-coerced sterilization of poor women and women of color, or the broader tendency in 
this discourse to portray the poor and dark in terms of Gothic fecundity and crowding, as Paul Ehrlich 
had done in The Population Bomb. PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB 1–2 (1968). For an 
essential discussion of these themes, see generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: 
RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997). For the famous passage on the 
“population explosion,” see EHRLICH, supra, at 1. 
 162.  Cf. MARK SQUILLACE, THE STRIP MINING HANDBOOK: A COALFIELD CITIZENS’ GUIDE TO 
USING THE LAW TO FIGHT BACK AGAINST THE RAVAGES OF STRIP MINING AND UNDERGROUND 
MINING 5–15 (1990). 
 163.  Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(3) (2012). 
 164.  See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C § 1311(a) (2012) (“[T]he discharge of any pollutant by any 
person shall be unlawful.”); Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc., v. Rivenburgh, 204 F. Supp. 2d 
927, 931 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (holding that this prohibition on water pollution bars discharge of 
overburden into mountain streams), vacated 317 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. 2003) (reversing and vacating the 
district court decision). 
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authorizing the overburden burial of streams totaling as much as two thousand 
miles in length.165 Yet, surface mining was not really on the agenda of the 
national environmental groups until around 2000; it fell to investigative 
journalists and local advocacy groups to monitor state permitting practices and 
eventually bring the suits that called mountaintop removal into question.166 
Only then did Earthjustice (the former Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund) enter 
the legal fray.167 Today a practice that the mainstream environmental-law 
agenda was arguably decades late in incorporating has produced what is 
probably the largest topographic, hydrological, and ecological transformation 
of a North American landscape in at least fifty years.168 The relative omission 
of this issue in a decisive pair of decades is just one consequence of the form 
that mainstream environmentalism took in the early and mid-1980s. 
What accounts for the form in which the environmental movement 
consolidated itself in the 1980s? There is contingency: Reuther’s death and the 
self-immolation of Arnold Miller’s UMWA presidency cost environmentalists 
potential allies; the Ford Foundation’s decision not to make a substantial grant 
to Environmental Action, the nonprofit that organized Earth Day, reflected 
Ford’s preference for expert and professional advocacy, but Ford’s effort in 
 
 165.  See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21421, MOUNTAINTOP MINING: 
BACKGROUND ON CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 1 (2015) (noting that almost twelve hundred miles of 
Appalachian streams were buried by surface coal mining practices between 1992 and 2011); EPA Issues 
Comprehensive Guidance to Protect Appalachian Communities from Harmful Environmental Impacts of 
Mountaintop Mining, EPA (Apr. 1, 2010), https://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/bd4 
379a92ceceeac8525735900400c27/4145c96189a17239852576f8005867bd!OpenDocument (giving an 
“estimate” of two thousand miles in total of Appalachian headwater streams that have been buried by 
mountaintop coal mining). 
 166.  See, e.g., Penny Loeb, Shear Madness, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 11, 1997, at 26 
(reporting on mountaintop removal at the national level for the first time in the mid-1990s); Bragg v. 
Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 663 (S.D. W. Va. 1999) (invalidating a mountaintop removal stream-
filling), vacated Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001) (reversing the district court); 
Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 930. 
 167.  Based on personal conversations with Steve Roady of Earthjustice and West Virginia 
environmental litigator Joe Lovett, this has been a productive collaboration. Mountaintop removal 
remains in public view today, despite the courtroom losses. 
 168.  According to a 2016 study, significant parts of Central Appalachia have been transformed 
from a mix of steep slopes and narrow but flat valley floors and ridgelines to a blend of nearly flat post-
mining plateaus and modest slopes. Matthew R. V. Ross et al., Deep Impact: Effects of Mountaintop 
Mining on Surface Topography, Bedrock Structure, and Downstream Waters, 50 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 
2064, 2064‒65 (2016). This terrain is the product of removing up to six hundred vertical feet of hill and 
mountain and, in turn, burying valleys in as many vertical feet of overburden. See id. at 2067. The 
characteristic hardwood forests of the region do not generally return, and overburden-filled valleys 
retain about ten times more water than the pre-mining landforms did. See id. at 2064‒65. According to 
Appalachian Voices, an advocacy group, mountaintop removal has eliminated more than five hundred 
distinct mountains from the region’s terrain. ROSS GEREDIEN, APPALACHIAN VOICES, POST-
MOUNTAINTOP REMOVAL RECLAMATION OF MOUNTAIN SUMMITS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 
APPALACHIA 2 (2009) (prepared for Natural Resources Defense Council). 
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developing the grant proposal indicates openness to more activism-oriented 
environmentalism.169 
But there were also tectonic shifts in politics and political economy that 
helped to close the window that seemed to open in the early days of post-1970 
environmental politics. At least part of the failure of justice-oriented 
environmentalism to take institutional root seems to be owing to the political 
economy of available funders and allies. The role of labor changed in a way 
that restricted its potential as an environmental ally. As noted earlier, the bread-
and-butter labor movement that the corporatist NLRA model of collective 
bargaining nurtured within the terms of the Treaty of Detroit had already 
reduced most unions’ engagement with broader questions of power, 
distribution, and social provision; Reuther’s UAW and, more markedly, the 
Miners for Democracy were exceptions to this pattern. After the mid-1970s, 
however, labor fell increasingly into a defensive position as blue-collar wages 
stagnated and a decline in industrial employment set in; both of these trends 
were accelerated by the deflationary monetary policy of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Reuther’s social unionism had reflected a role that organized labor 
played for some decades as the left wing of a set of civic, economic, and 
political institutions that sat at the center of a loosely corporatist mutual 
accommodation of economic interests. With Jimmy Carter’s 1976 election to 
the presidency and Democratic congressional majorities, many labor leaders 
and activists imagined an expansion and consolidation of New Deal and Great 
Society commitments.170 When this agenda was shredded, signally in the ill-
fated Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment bill, labor was served notice that 
its settled place in American political economy was in question, a notice that 
announced the beginning of a long, receding struggle for survival. 
Whether one interprets these events as consequences of a more or less 
agency-free shift in the distributional dynamics of capitalism, or as the product 
of a deliberate political revolt of capital against the constraints of the post-
World War II accommodation, the result was the same: to put labor in a 
defensive posture in which a zero-sum logic of “jobs versus environment” 
named an urgently felt reality.171 Particularly after the failure on either side to 
build deep or enduring labor-environmental alliances in the 1970s, when those 
might have contributed to defining the scope and priorities of environmental 
 
 169.  See GOTTLIEB, supra note 85, at 186‒87 (contending that in the aftermath of Earth Day, 
“most groups felt an even more pressing need to professionalize”). 
 170.  See COWIE, supra note 134, at 261‒312 (discussing in some political detail the aspirations 
and demise of “the New Deal that never happened”). 
 171.  Cf. Thomas Piketty, Toward a Reconciliation between Economics and the Social Sciences, in 
AFTER PIKETTY: THE AGENDA FOR ECONOMICS AND INEQUALITY 543–65 (Heather Boushey & J. 
Bradford DeLong eds., 2017). See generally PIKETTY, supra note 1 (arguing, seemingly, for an agency-
free, structural account of inequality); WOLFGANG STREECK, BUYING TIME: THE DELAYED CRISIS OF 
CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 3–6 (Patrick Camiller trans., 2014) (arguing that since the 1970s the 
arrangements of mid-century social democracy have suffered a series of crises spurred by relation social 
scarcity).  
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law rather than simply expressing occasional tactical overlap, labor and 
environmentalism had moved far apart by the 1980s. With no real prospect of 
labor allies, it was all the easier for environmental groups to turn to the wealthy 
donors who remain critical to their flourishing, and who, as a group, are not 
great enthusiasts for class antagonism. 
The shape of the post-1970 statutes played a role as well; CWA 
enforcement litigation, which brings attorneys’ fees, became a staple of 
environmental activism in the 1980s, when environmentalists substituted their 
own enforcement efforts for the deliberate inactivity of the Reagan 
Administration’s EPA.172 Neither donor nor statutory funding sources, then, 
drove environmental groups to cultivate the strands of work that would have 
made environmental justice commitments central. 
There was, then, a two-stage creation of the mainstream environmentalism 
whose blind spots and exclusions were among the reasons that environmental 
justice arose in its current form. The first stage was in the decline in attention to 
distributive politics, the workplace, and economic order in the period when 
post-1960 environmentalism and post-1970 environmental law were taking 
form, a decline that I have traced in part to the political economy of the post-
War period. The second stage came in the 1970s and early 1980s, when 
mainstream environmentalism mostly failed to take up the more justice-
oriented themes that had never disappeared from grassroots activism. 
The environmental law that the environmental justice movement first 
defined itself by criticizing deserved much of the criticism. That version of 
environmental law, however, was a product of more recent events than either 
its participants or its critics entirely recognized. A forgetfulness shared between 
the mainstream and its critics has diminished attention to the long 
environmental justice movement, which persisted from the early twentieth 
century through the ferment of the 1970s. That forgetfulness may have 
contributed, also, to a too-ready acceptance of a rather specialized and 
supplemental role for environmental justice considerations within the larger 
body of environmental law: as a mandatory procedural consideration in 
administrative decisions and a tactical resource in political fights over siting 
hazardous facilities. These roles matter, but they are narrower than the 
invitation that environmental justice makes: to take seriously the question of 
inequality in the human environments that law pervasively shapes. They are 
narrower, too, than the interest in economic power, the workplace, and political 
accountability that animated the long history of environmental justice. The next 
Part argues that an expansive view of the meaning of environmental justice—in 
both its recent and its long versions—can help to identify the justice 
dimensions of issues outside today’s core legal operation of environmental 
justice considerations. It also argues that thinking about these less conventional 
 
 172.  See ANDREWS, supra note 19, at 255‒62 (discussing this period).  
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environmental justice questions helps to clarify more generally environmental 
law’s relation to questions of inequality. 
V.  AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE APPROACH TO FOOD SYSTEMS 
Although agricultural issues received intensive legal attention throughout 
the twentieth century, from food-safety regulation to farming subsidies, they 
never became central to environmental law. Their marginality was 
overdetermined; much early environmental discourse was indifferent to 
agriculture, institutionalized movement-building long followed suit, and 
agricultural industries won exemptions from much post-1970 environmental 
regulation. Those exemptions, in turn, limited the opportunity of environmental 
advocacy groups and enforcement agencies to orient themselves toward 
agricultural questions. 
This Part addresses two aspects of the American food system: first, the air 
and water pollution connected with concentrated animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs) and, second, the allocation of productive resources to corn-and-
soybean-based calories through statutory crop supports. It argues that 
understanding these as environmental justice issues is illuminating in a pair of 
ways. First, concentration of weakly regulated air and water pollution from 
CAFOs in regions with vulnerable populations compromises the original 
environmental justice commitment of the anti-pollution statutes: setting a limit 
on exposure to air and water pollution as a kind of right for all, regardless of 
who or where one is. For agencies to develop aggressive and enforceable 
regulation in this area would vindicate an environmental justice commitment 
that already exists in the statutes, though it is not conventionally articulated as 
such. Second, the food environment that agricultural law shapes is, like air and 
water, a bearer of disparate health hazards. The fact that individual consumer 
decisions about what food to buy and eat mediates these hazards does not 
diminish their significance as environmental justice considerations, but rather 
highlights their importance as such. 
A. Pollution Risk from Food Production 
In roughly the past forty years, with a sharp acceleration in the 1980s, 
commercial meat production has moved from relatively small-scale, mixed 
grain-and-livestock operations to a smaller number of much larger and 
specialized operations.173 Central to the new meat economy are the industrial-
 
 173.  For an overview of the state of animal production in the pork industry, which has seen 
especially dramatic concentration, see NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. HOG INDUSTRY (2009). Large feeding operations have grown in number, small 
operations have fallen, and as of 2012, 96 percent of U.S. pork production took place in CAFOs with 
more than 1000 hogs, which the EPA defines as a “large” CAFO. Number of U.S. Hog Operations by 
Size Groups and Percent of Inventory, PORK CHECKOFF, http://www.pork.org/pork-quick-
facts/home/stats/structure-and-productivity/number-of-u-s-hog-operations-by-size-groups-and-percent-
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scale enterprises that the EPA designates as CAFOs.174 A CAFO generally 
houses one thousand to twenty-five hundred hogs in a building (typically in a 
cluster of similarly sized buildings), many thousands of chickens in a similar 
facility, or at least one thousand cattle in a feedlot. 
Like the rest of the food system, CAFOs are deeply shaped by the law. It 
is widely understood that the anti-pollution statutes substantially exempted 
most farming activity from regulation, and that such “non-point-source” 
pollution as fertilizer runoff remains a major barrier to statutory clean-water 
goals; agricultural greenhouse-gas emissions now similarly pose problems for 
climate-change policy.175 Although the CWA applies to CAFOs explicitly and 
the CAA reaches them in principle, enforcement has persistently lagged CAFO 
growth.176 Regulatory foot-dragging and exemptions, the difficulty of 
monitoring agricultural emissions even in concentrated operations, and the 
political power of agriculture have interacted to limit effective regulatory 
attention to CAFO pollution.177 CAFOs also gain competitive advantages from 
subsidies to corn and soybeans, which press the cost of CAFO feed stock below 
market levels.178 
 
of-inventory/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (citing figures from 2012 USDA Census of Agriculture); see 
also 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(b)(4) (2017) (EPA definition of “large” CAFO). 
 174.  EPA, REGULATORY DEFINITIONS OF LARGE CAFOS, MEDIUM CAFO, AND SMALL CAFOS,  
https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/sector_table.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (giving CAFO definition 
for a variety of meat-producing species). A CAFO is defined as a point source of water pollution in the 
Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2012). 
 175.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (“This term [‘point source’] does not include agricultural 
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.”). Estimates of the contribution of 
agriculture to climate change range from an EPA ascription of 7.4 percent of U.S. greenhouse gases to 
agriculture to a Pew estimate that puts industrial agriculture at 18 percent of global greenhouse gas 
emissions. See EPA, INVENTORY OF THE U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2005 ES-
12 (2007); ROLF U. HALDEN & KELLOGG J. SCHWAB, PEW COMM’N ON INDUS. FARM ANIMAL PROD., 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL FARM ANIMAL PRODUCTION 22 (2006).  
 176.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (listing CAFOs under the Clean Water Act’s definition of a “point 
source” of water pollution). EPA did not develop a comprehensive regulatory program for CAFO 
pollutants until required to do so under a consent decree. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Reilly, No. 89-
2980 (RCL), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5334, at *28–*29 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1991) (resulting in a consent 
decree). In the meantime, Congress in 1987 exempted “agricultural stormwater discharges” and 
“agricultural return flows” from the statutory definition of “point source.” See Act of Feb. 4, 1987, Pub. 
L. No. 100-4, § 503, 101 Stat. 7, 75. These exemptions have been interpreted to limit the scope of EPA’s 
authority to regulate CAFOs. See Waterkeeper All., Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 501–02 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(discussing the statutory limits on EPA’s CAFO regulation). Similarly, EPA has generally declined to 
develop Clean Air Act standards for CAFOs, despite being significant sources of hydrogen sulfide, 
ammonia, particulate matter, volatile organic compounds, and greenhouse gases. See Teresa B. 
Clemmer, Agriculture and the Clean Air Act, in FOOD, AGRICULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 163, 
163‒69 (Mary Jane Angelo et al. eds., 2013). 
 177.  For instance, in North Carolina, waste lagoons were not required to include anti-seepage 
lining or to observe a minimum setback from streams and rivers before 1997, when the state adopted its 
first Clean Water Act permitting requirements for CAFOs. Many of those lagoons remain in use. 
Current regulations require a minimum setback of 100 feet from perennial streams. 15A N.C. ADMIN. 
CODE 2T.0506 (2017). 
 178.  The structure and effect of these subsidies is discussed in Part V.B. For a treatment of their 
contribution to the competitiveness of CAFOs, see ELANOR STARMER AND TIMOTHY A. WISE, GLOBAL 
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CAFOs also depend on the use of sub-therapeutic doses of antibiotics as a 
prophylaxis against epidemics among their closely confined populations.179 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval is necessary for use of 
antibiotics in commercial livestock operations, and has become increasingly 
controversial in light of growing awareness that pervasive, low-level antibiotics 
use increases the likelihood of antibiotic-resistant bacterial strains emerging. 
The Centers for Disease Control in 2013 called the threat from antibiotic-
resistant bacterial strains “potentially catastrophic” (not with specific reference 
to livestock administration) and urged “immediate action.”180 The problem of 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria that might be bred inadvertently in the food system 
itself deserves attention as an environmental threat; NRDC recognized as much 
in bringing the recent suit that helped to force the FDA’s attention to the 
issue.181 For this discussion’s purposes, though, the regulatory tolerance of sub-
therapeutic antibiotics represents another way that the prominence of CAFOs in 
meat production results from legal tolerance of CAFO risks and thus arguably 
amounts to a regulatory subsidy that shapes the country’s food system toward 
concentrated, industrial-style production, and in turn entails a further specific 
distribution of environmental risk and harm. 
The distribution of environmental burdens from CAFOs creates something 
approaching a series of regional exceptions to the strong egalitarian policy of 
the anti-pollution statutes. Because those statutes created strong nationwide 
standards for air quality and water pollution, their architects understood them as 
 
DEV. & ENV’T INST., TUFTS UNIVERSITY, FEEDING AT THE TROUGH: INDUSTRIAL LIVESTOCK FIRMS 
SAVED $35 BILLION FROM LOW FEED PRICES 1 (2007), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PB07-
03FeedingAtTroughDec07.pdf. 
 179.  Sub-therapeutic doses are aimed at “increased rate of weight gain” and disease prevention but 
are not intended to treat disease. 21 C.F.R. §§ 558.55–558.680 (2017). 
 180.  CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2013). The Centers for Disease Control 
report goes on to urge caution in livestock administration of antibiotics, recommending in particular that 
antibiotics be used under veterinary supervision and only for disease control (not weight gain, another 
traditional use). Id. at 36‒38. At that time, the FDA had nominally been studying the issue since 1970, 
when it first instituted a task force, which, in 1972, recommended withdrawing approval of all sub-
therapeutic antibiotic administration to protect public health. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. FDA, 760 
F.3d 151, 154 (2d. Cir. 2014). Hearings on a proposed withdrawal of approval were announced in 1977 
but never held, and the question was dormant until a spate of suits in the last decade sought to restart the 
process. See, e.g., id. at 153 (reversing a district court ruling that had sided with NRDC in holding that 
FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in ending the withdrawal process after an initial finding by the 
director that livestock administration of antibiotics had not been shown to be safe for public health). The 
suits ended in defeat for the environmentalist plaintiffs, and the FDA has issued only nonbinding 
recommendations to discipline livestock antibiotics administration. See id.; see also FDA, U.S. DEPT. OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY NO. 213: NEW ANIMAL DRUGS AND NEW 
ANIMAL DRUG COMBINATION PRODUCTS ADMINISTERED IN OR ON MEDICATED FEED OR DRINKING 
WATER OF FOOD-PRODUCING ANIMALS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DRUG SPONSORS FOR VOLUNTARILY 
ALIGNING PRODUCT USE CONDITIONS WITH GFI #209 (Dec. 2013). California in 2015 passed a statute 
prohibiting the use of antibiotics for livestock weight gain and requiring other uses to be subject to 
veterinary supervision; whether this change will be consequential remains to be seen. See S. 27, 2015‒
16 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015) (codified at CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 14400–14408 (2017)). 
 181.  See Nat. Res. Def. Council, 760 F.3d at 153. 
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connected with the larger agenda of racial and economic justice and as creating, 
in effect if not in form, a right to clean air and clean water.182 Permissive 
regulation of the regionally concentrated CAFO industry produces 
economically and racially disparate vulnerability that violates the anti-pollution 
statutes’ animating expectation of a nationally shared baseline of clean water 
and air. That expectation, recall, was the primary response of the statutes’ 
architects to criticism from Nader-led environmental justice advocates. 
CAFOs produce an enormous amount of animal waste, and although some 
of it is applied to farmland for its fertilizing properties, much of it contains 
more nitrogen and phosphorous than available soil can absorb, and so turns a 
potentially beneficial substance into a waste-disposal problem.183 Regions 
where CAFOs have flourished are also those where the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) reports high incidence of the biologically excessive 
nutrient levels that make agriculture the main contributor to American 
waterways remaining out of compliance with the CWA.184 Although animal 
waste from those CAFOs that are designated CWA point sources generally 
must be stored in a manner that isolates it from surface and groundwater, the 
lagoons that serve this purpose spill, leak, and mingle surface water during 
floods.185 Fish kills, algae blooms, contamination of downstream shellfish, and 
human exposure to bacteria, pathogens, and toxic levels of nitrates all 
follow.186 
CAFOs also produce air pollution. Although agriculture has become 
mildly notorious for the share of greenhouse-gas emissions that is traceable to 
animal production, CAFOs also emit fine particulates as well as hydrogen 
 
 182.  See supra notes 62‒65 and accompanying text (Muskie on this topic). 
 183.  A very large CAFO, with 800,000 hogs, would produce 1.6 million tons of waste per year, as 
much as the City of Philadelphia. CARRIE HRIBAR, NAT’L ASS’N OF LOCAL BDS. OF HEALTH, 
UNDERSTANDING CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
COMMUNITIES 2 (2010). More than 115 million hogs are raised for slaughter in the United States each 
year. NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., LIVESTOCK SLAUGHTER 2016 SUMMARY 
8 (2017). 
 184.  CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31851, ANIMAL WASTE AND WATER 
QUALITY: EPA REGULATION OF CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING OPERATIONS (CAFOS) 1‒3 (2010) 
(reporting a significant increase in the number of U.S. counties with nutrient imbalances and their 
prevalence in CAFO-rich regions). 
 185.  For instance, in North Carolina, waste lagoons were not required to include anti-seepage 
lining or to observe a minimum setback from streams and rivers before 1997, when the state adopted its 
first Clean Water Act permitting requirements for CAFOs. Many of those lagoons remain in use. 
Current regulations require a minimum setback of 100 feet from perennial streams. 15A N.C. ADMIN. 
CODE 2T.0506 (2017). 
 186.  See COPELAND, supra note 184, at 4‒5 (on animal waste and the environment); M.E. 
Anderson & M.D. Sobsey, Detection and Occurrence of Antimicrobially Resistant E. Coli in 
Groundwater on or Near Swine Farms in Eastern North Carolina, 54 WATER SCI. & TECH., no. 3, Aug. 
2006, at 211, 217‒18 (finding contamination of groundwater near lagoons with high levels of antibiotic-
resistant E. coli). For a vivid portrayal of the effects of recent flooding in the Carolinas on the 
widespread CAFOs of those states’ coastal regions, see Tom Philpott, Hurricane Matthew Killed 
Millions of Farm Animals in North Carolina, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.mother 
jones.com/environment/2016/10/hurricane-matthew-killed-animals-hog-poop. 
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sulfide and other volatile organic compounds (VOCs), which have significant 
effects on health and quality of life in the local area.187 CAFOs also house 
airborne biological agents, including bacteria and mold spores, as well as 
various allergens.188 
These local and regional environmental burdens of animal agriculture are 
distributed unevenly with respect to poverty and race. Researchers have found 
different degrees of correlation—some negligible, some significant—between 
the location of CAFOs and the percentage of low-income and nonwhite 
populations in otherwise comparable areas, with especially strong correlations 
for poultry CAFOs and for low-income and Latino populations.189 A broader-
brush description, while it comes at the cost of some precision, captures a 
larger pattern that is important here. The regions where CAFOs have expanded 
most rapidly tend to resist fine-grained intra-regional contrasts precisely 
because, like the North Carolina coastal plain, the Delmarva Peninsula, and 
other rural regions of the low-country South, they are pervasively poor and, in 
many cases, heavily nonwhite. There is no need to rely on racial or other 
targeting, such as was often claimed in early environmental justice cases and 
has been much investigated in the empirical literature on toxins. Nor is it 
necessary to rely on the alternative explanation, rearrangement of intra-regional 
populations by market dynamics after CAFOs have been cited, to appreciate 
that these facilities are pervasive in parts of the country where there are many 
nonwhite people and relatively few wealthy or highly-educated individuals—
not just near the CAFOs, but anywhere in shouting distance. Taking one swipe 
at this issue, Steve Wing and Jill Johnston estimated that, when they examined 
a broad swath of North Carolina to compare CAFO and non-CAFO localities 
(but excluded dense urban areas and western mountain counties, which have no 
hog CAFOs), the proportion of African Americans and Latinos within three 
miles of hog CAFOs was respectively 1.54 and 1.39 times that of non-Hispanic 
whites.190 They found that in census blocks with at least 80 percent people of 
 
 187.  CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32948, AIR QUALITY ISSUES AND ANIMAL AGRICULTURE: A 
PRIMER 2‒4 (2016). 
 188.  Id. at 4.  
 189.  See e.g., Kelley J. Dunham et al., Community Health and Socioeconomic Issues surrounding 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 317, 318 (2007) (finding race 
and income correlations for hog CAFOs); S.M. Rafael Harun & Yelena Ogneva-Himmelberger, 
Distribution of Industrial Farms in the United States and Socioeconomic, Health, and Environmental 
Characteristics, GEOGRAPHY J., 2013, at 6, 10 (finding significant correlations only for chicken CAFOs 
at the county level); Sacoby M. Wilson et al., Environmental Injustice and the Mississippi Hog Industry, 
110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 195, 197 (2002) (finding race and income correlations for hog CAFOs); cf. 
JEN HORTON, THE SITING OF INDUSTRIAL HOG FARMING OPERATIONS IN EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA: 
A CASE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE 108–12 (2012) (master’s degree thesis comparing areas within 
one- and three-mile radii of hog CAFOs with random areas in the same regions and finding little 
correlation with race, somewhat more with educational level, and growing disparities in home values 
between the two sets of samples). 
 190.  STEVE WING & JILL JOHNSTON, INDUSTRIAL HOG OPERATIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA 
DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT AFRICAN-AMERICANS, HISPANICS AND AMERICAN INDIANS 1 (2014), 
http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/UNC-Report.pdf. 
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color, the share of the population living within 3 miles of a hog CAFO was 
twice as high as in other census blocks.191 As they rather vividly put it, for 
every ten percentage-point increase in the share of people of color in a North 
Carolina census block, the weight of hog waste produced annually within three 
miles of that block grows by fifty tons.192 
In the absence of richer and more precise evidence of substantial and 
disparate harm from weak CAFO regulation, the strength of my claim must 
remain conditional. That said, there exists a real cause for concern that the anti-
pollution statutes are not doing their work, resulting in precisely the disparate 
impact that these statutes were meant to avert. Remedying this situation would 
not require statutory amendment, like eliminating the CWA’s exemption for 
“non-point source” agricultural pollution, nor changing Supreme Court 
doctrine, like reviving disparate-impact claims after Washington v. Davis193 
and Alexander v. Sandoval.194 It would only mean doing the equality-securing 
work that the statutes were written to do. 
B. Food, Health Risk, and Economic Inequality 
Since the New Deal, the American food economy has been pervasively 
shaped by federal regulation well beyond the farm. The modern era of 
agricultural law began with New Deal federal crop insurance and the 
production controls of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (best recalled in legal 
circles for having been upheld in Wickard v. Filburn).195 In recent decades, the 
Farm Bill, which is reauthorized roughly every five years, has directed 
hundreds of billions of dollars to farmers in direct payments to commodity 
producers (growers of corn, soybeans, and certain other relatively imperishable 
“commodity crops”) and in subsidized insurance for shortfalls in production or 
revenue (the latter on account of either low production or low prices). The 2014 
Farm Bill directed $21 billion over 5 years to commodity-support programs and 
$44 billion to general crop insurance subsidies, for which a broader range of 
crops is eligible.196 
 
 191.  Id.  
 192.  Id. 
 193.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (finding no equal protection claim from a 
showing of disparate racial impact absent evidence of purposeful discrimination by an official actor). 
 194.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that disparate-impact 
regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act do not give rise to 
individual causes of action). 
 195.  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 117 (1942); Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. 
No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31; see also Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 
(repealed 1938). The 1906 Act paved the way for the eventual creation of the FDA. 
 196.  Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649. For budgetary breakdown, see 
RENÉE JOHNSON & JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22131, WHAT IS THE FARM BILL? 5 
(2014). Over the decades, including in the early twenty-first century, these subsidies have often taken 
the form of direct payments to farmers on the basis of historical levels of production on their acreage, or 
of “top-off” price subsidies to bring farmers’ per-unit income to a floor that was often above market 
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Farm supports contribute to what public-health scholars call an 
“obesogenic” food environment, one tending to produce obesity by presenting 
people with abundant, inexpensive, calorie-rich foods heavy in sugars and fats, 
while keeping fruits and vegetables relatively expensive.197 According to the 
Centers for Disease Control, 36.5 percent of American adults are obese, with 
rates reaching 48 percent among African Americans and 42.5 percent among 
Latinos.198 In 2007, USDA researchers reported that the average American’s 
daily calorie intake had increased by four hundred calories since 1985, and by 
six hundred calories since 1970.199 Most of these calories came from increased 
consumption of grains, sugars, and fats (the last mostly vegetable oils).200 The 
increase in caloric intake drew most heavily on the most intensively subsidized 
food sources. Among grains, corn calories rose 191 percent.201 Corn sweetener 
calories, chiefly high-fructose corn syrup, rose 359 percent to 246 daily calories 
for the average American; they represent in themselves a very significant share 
of the total caloric increase.202 Calories from salads and cooking oils increased 
by 260 percent; 70 percent of these calories come from heavily subsidized 
soybeans.203 
The social cost of diet-related health problems is considerable. Obesity 
and follow-on ailments cost the U.S. health system as much as $190 billion 
annually.204 The annual cost of diabetes alone (not restricted to the share 
attributable to diet) has been estimated at $176 billion in medical care and an 
additional $69 billion in lost productivity.205 As noted earlier, these medical 
burdens are distributed in patterns that track other dimensions of disadvantage: 
obesity rates are significantly higher in African American and Latino 
populations than among whites; among women, obesity is greater among those 
with less education.206 Rates of diagnosed diabetes are under 8 percent for non-
 
level. At present, commodity-support spending takes the form of subsidized insurance policies that pay 
out in the event of either low production or low prices. 
 197.  See David Wallinga, Agricultural Policy and Childhood Obesity: A Food Systems and Public 
Health Commentary, 29 HEALTH AFF. 405, 405‒10 (2010); cf. JULIE GUTHMAN, WEIGHING IN: 
OBESITY, FOOD JUSTICE, AND THE LIMITS OF CAPITALISM 116‒39 (2011) (arguing that the “cheap 
calories” argument is too simple to account for obesity, and assigning responsibility to concentrated 
market power and low pay for workers). 
 198.  Adult Obesity Facts, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
obesity/data/adult.html (last updated Aug. 29, 2017). 
 199.  Wallinga, supra note 197, at 405‒06. 
 200.  Id. at 405.  
 201.  Id. at 406.  
 202.  Id.; see also ALICIA HARVIE & TIMOTHY A. WISE, GLOBAL DEV. & ENV’T INST., TUFTS 
UNIV., SWEETENING THE POT: IMPLICIT SUBSIDIES TO CORN SWEETENERS AND THE U.S. OBESITY 
EPIDEMIC (2009), http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PB09-01SweeteningPotFeb09.pdf. 
 203.  Wallinga, supra note 197, at 406. 
 204.  John Cawley & Chad Meyerhoefer, The Medical Care Costs of Obesity: An Instrumental 
Variables Approach, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 219, 226 (2012). 
 205.  Wenya Yang et al., Economic Costs of Diabetes Care in the U.S. in 2012, 36 DIABETES CARE 
1033, 1033 (2013). 
 206.  See Adult Obesity Facts, supra note 198. 
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Hispanic whites, over 12 percent for Latinos, and over 13 percent for non-
Hispanic African Americans.207 And diabetes takes a greater toll among the 
poor and uneducated: both having dropped out of high school and living in 
poverty are correlated, after correcting for confounding variables, with risks of 
dying from diabetes twice as high as for those who hold a college degree or live 
in a high-income household, respectively.208 
The contribution of an environmental justice analysis here is to propose 
seeing the food system as an environmental medium that distributes exposure 
to health risk. The medium of exposure is food prices. Subsidized corn and 
soybean production, combined with a near-absence of policy support for fruit 
and vegetable production, produces a vast stockpile of potential calories from 
the subsidized goods, driving down the relative prices of foods derived from 
them. Between 1985 and 2000, for instance, the inflation-adjusted price of 
carbonated soft drinks fell by nearly 24 percent, while the price of fresh fruits 
and vegetables rose by 39 percent.209 
Of course, there is a vivid difference between traditional environmental 
risks, paradigmatically pollution, and the risks produced and distributed 
through the food system. Exposure to pollution is generally involuntary and 
widely shared, which contributed to Rachel Carson’s rhetorical comparison of 
toxins to nuclear fallout in Silent Spring. The risks under discussion here 
always rely on the individual choice to purchase and consume food, meaning 
they are neither generally shared nor involuntary. Can such risks be said to be 
environmental, let alone concerns of environmental justice? 
Here the intellectual resources of the environmental justice tradition cast 
light on the question. The reason that the roots of pollution politics and science 
lie partly in workplace safety issues, including unions’ struggles around 
working conditions, is precisely the recognition that there are layers of choice 
and determination in any decision. The Workers’ Health Bureau of the 1920s, 
for instance, operated in a political and legal environment in which the 
paradigm case of voluntary action was the labor contract.210 But as labor and 
Legal Realist critics argued, while workers and employers chose the terms of 
their contracts, they did not choose the conditions in which they contracted, and 
 
 207.  Statistics about Diabetes, AM. DIABETES ASS’N, http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-basics/ 
statistics/ (last updated July 19, 2017). 
 208.  See Sharon Saydah & Kimberly Lochner, Socioeconomic Status and Risk of Diabetes-Related 
Mortality in the U.S., 125 PUB. HEALTH REP. 377, 387 (2010). High school dropouts are more than 60 
percent more likely to have diabetes than people with some college education. A 2007 National Bureau 
of Economic Research study concluded that education made a significant difference in risk even 
accounting for correlated risk factors. See JAMES SMITH, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, 
DIABETES AND THE RISE OF THE SES HEALTH GRADIENT 17 (2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w12905.pdf. 
 209.  See Wallinga, supra note 197, at 407 (reporting estimates derived from USDA figures). 
 210.  See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (putting liberty of contract at the center of 
the “liberty” term of the Due Process Clause, with specific reference to a labor agreement); Jedediah 
Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
no. 4, 2014, at 195, 196‒98 (discussing the usefulness and limitations of later comparisons to Lochner). 
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these did much to constitute the scope of their effective options.211 Likewise, 
consumers choose their meals, but not the background of food prices and 
consequent tradeoffs that result from their choices. The exercise of food choice 
is conditioned by the intersection of price-shaping agricultural policy, on the 
one hand, and the distribution of income and wealth, on the other.212 And 
eating, after all, is no more optional than breathing. The fact that what one eats 
is always a choice means that every meal is an opportunity for economic 
inequality to translate into different levels of risk exposure.213 
What should be the response? The Farm Bill’s subsidies are typically 
revisited every five years, and there have recently been some progressive 
efforts by environmental and public-health groups to redirect it toward smaller-
scale operations and healthier crops.214 Partly in response to public interest in 
food issues, environmental organizations have sought legal hooks to engage 
food production.215 Here the first line of potential action is almost certainly 
political, and would involve an effort to join justice-oriented and environmental 
constituencies around a newly shared sense of a common problem. Although 
“Congress should change the law” is an unsatisfying prescription nowadays for 
reasons that need no rehearsing, political circumstances can change. When they 
do, advocates should be clear on which questions they regard as environmental 
justice priorities, and why. The law-shaped food environment belongs among 
those. 
C. Summary 
A more complete analysis of the food system’s relevance to environmental 
justice would integrate issues that this discussion has not reached, and that 
would further test the borders of the topic. These include the disproportionate 
decline in African American farm ownership under USDA lending policies that 
 
 211.  See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 
POL. SCI. Q. 470, 474–79 (1923) (arguing that legal structure has pervasive influence on supposedly 
voluntary decisions); cf. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. 
REV. 175 (2003) (arguing an updated version of the same thesis, though with an interest in subtle 
decision cues rather than “coercion”). 
 212.  See, e.g., Andrea Freeman, The 2014 Farm Bill: Farm Subsidies and Food Oppression, 38 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1271, 1275–77 (2015) (arguing along these lines). 
 213.  Of course, the ways that economic inequality distributes exposure to unsafe air has long been 
a concern for environmental justice. There is considerable opportunity to spend money controlling the 
kind of water to which one is exposed, whether through living in Westchester rather than Flint or 
through purchases of drinking water. I do not mean to say that these risks are not structured by 
inequality-plus-choice, but only that diet-related risks are much more pervasively structured in this 
manner.  
 214.  For instance, the National Law School Farm Bill Research Consortium has been working for 
a decade to design such reforms for the Farm Bill. Representatives from the Yale Environmental 
Protection Clinic, the Harvard Food Law and Policy Clinic, the Resnick Program for Food Law and 
Policy, and others contribute to this effort. 
 215.  See, for example, the NRDC litigation on sub-therapeutic antibiotic use in CAFOs, discussed 
above in Part V.A. 
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effectively facilitated racial exclusion by local lending boards;216 highly 
concentrated ownership in the industries that purchase and process farmed 
goods, which is widely reported to affect prices and contract terms for farmers, 
especially small and mid-sized ones;217 and the low pay and high rates of injury 
and toxic exposure that workers experience in many areas of agricultural 
production and processing, not least because of the substantial exemption of 
farm labor from the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act.218 Whether 
these are questions of environmental justice per se, or simply aspects of the 
distributional political economy of the food system, is probably not a question 
with a conceptually required answer, so much as it is a matter of the work that 
advocates, movements, and officials seek to do with the categories of 
“environmental problem” and “environmental justice.” If they define risks to 
health from the law-shaped food system as paradigm problems, and demand 
both the intentional provision of a healthful food environment and the 
enforcement of basic anti-pollution commitments against industrial-scale 
agricultural operations in regions whose populations are already socially 
vulnerable, they will have made the law’s role in this field a central question of 
environmental justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Since its emergence as a self-aware movement in the 1980s, 
environmental justice has shaped environmental law in ways that go well 
beyond the procedural requirements of Executive Order 12898. In particular, it 
has infused awareness of disparate impacts and racial inequality into the 
activity of agencies and professional and advocacy organizations. Both 
procedural mandates and institutional measures adopted voluntarily in response 
to justice claims have expanded the range of interests and perspectives 
represented in environmental decision making and advocacy, and inserted 
questions of fairness into every stage and site of deliberation, from goal setting 
 
 216.  See HOSSEIN AYAZI & ELSADIG ELSHEIKH, HAAS INST. FOR A FAIR & INCLUSIVE SOC’Y, THE 
U.S. FARM BILL: CORPORATE POWER AND STRUCTURAL RACIALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES FOOD 
SYSTEM 52‒60 (2015) (examining the Farm Service Agency lending programs, Farm Bill commodity 
programs, and Farm Bill Rural Development programs). 
 217.  A decade ago, Mary Hendrickson and William Heffernan of the University of Missouri 
estimated the market share of the largest 4 firms in the following areas: beef packers, 84 percent in 2005, 
up from 72 percent in 1990; pork packers, 64 percent in 2005, up from 40 percent in 1990; flour milling 
(from commodity grain) 63 percent, up from 40 percent in 1982. See MARY HENDRICKSON & WILLIAM 
HEFFERNAN, DEPT. OF RURAL SOCIOLOGY, UNIV. OF MO., CONCENTRATION OF AGRICULTURAL 
MARKETS 1, 2 (2007), http://www.foodcircles.missouri.edu/07contable.pdf. 
 218.  Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2012) (exempting agricultural workers from 
overtime pay and minimum wage requirements). But see Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801‒1872 (prescribing wage protections, housing and transportation 
safety standards, farm labor contractor registration requirements, and disclosure requirements for 
agricultural workers).  
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to administrative enforcement and permitting processes. But there is still more 
to learn. 
The first step is recognizing the historical trajectory of the long 
environmental justice movement, the circumstances of the mid-twentieth 
century that narrowed its concerns to more conventionally “environmental” 
ones, and the events of the 1970s that helped to produce the “mainstream 
environmentalism” that environmental justice defined itself by criticizing. The 
limitations in environmental law that environmental justice points out are the 
products of assumptions that no longer hold: that economic inequality was 
declining, that legal liberalism was an adequate mode of advocacy, that 
environmental law making could rely on legal mechanisms outside the 
environmental statutes to address disparate impact. In the 1970s, as these 
assumptions were coming under pressure, environmental law took institutional 
forms that, for all their achievements, continued its relative neglect of 
distribution, participation, and the total human environment. The repair of these 
omissions tends to make questions of justice an integral part of the work of 
environmental law. This reintegration of justice questions reflects two 
recognitions: that inequality will not decline spontaneously or for exogenous 
reasons, and that expert officials and advocates should not be certain that they 
know what justice might require in advance of a political argument over exactly 
that question. Inasmuch as environmental law grapples with these problems, it 
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